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Summary 
The causal factors of accidents from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) database and 
incidents from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) database associated with loss of control (LOC) 
were examined for four types of operations (i.e., Federal Aviation Regulation Part 121, Part 135 
Scheduled, Part 135 Nonscheduled, and Part 91) for the years 1988 to 2004. In-flight LOC is a serious 
aviation problem. Well over half of the LOC accidents included at least one fatality (80 percent in 
Part 121), and roughly half of all aviation fatalities in the studied time period occurred in conjunction with 
LOC.  
In about 30 percent of Part 121 LOC accidents, the LOC was secondary to a system/component 
failure/malfunction (SCFM), compared with 8 to 12 percent of the accidents in other flight operation 
categories. The most frequently cited components and systems were the engine and flight control system. 
Twenty-three percent of the Part 121 LOC accidents were secondary to aircraft damage (most often due to 
fire), compared with 3 to 8 percent of the accidents in other flight operation categories. As a result, for 
roughly 35 percent of the LOC accidents in Part 121, aircraft control was not possible, compared with 6 to 
9 percent of the accidents in other flight operation categories. In flights other than Part 121, 25 to 40 
percent of the LOC was caused by inadequate airspeed leading to an inadvertent stall. Icing (both 
preflight and in-flight) and adverse winds were the primary cause of a large number of accidents. Other 
frequently cited causes for LOC are inadequate preflight, improper planning or decisions, and flying in 
obscuration or at night. The accidents and incidents were divided into three groups: LOC secondary to 
SCFM, LOC secondary to aircraft damage, and LOC due to control upset.  
The Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) incident database was examined for three types of 
operation (Part 121, Part 135, and Part 91) for the years January 1993 to May 2008. From the analysis of 
this data, five aircraft systems have been identified as critical in regards to the frequency of incidents they 
represent. These systems are landing gear, brakes, air flight control, propulsion systems, and control 
surfaces.  
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Most accidents and incidents have more than one causal factor cited by accident and incident 
investigators.  
An adverse events table was updated to provide focus to the technology validation strategy of the 
Integrated Resilient Aircraft Control (IRAC) Project. The table contains three types of adverse conditions: 
failure, damage, and upset. Thirteen different adverse condition subtypes were gleaned from the ASRS, 
the FAA Accident and Incident database, and the NTSB database. The severity and frequency of the 
damage conditions, initial test conditions, and milestones references are also provided.  
1.0 Introduction 
1.1 Purpose of Study 
NASA’s Integrated Resilient Aircraft Control (IRAC) Project is one of four projects within the 
Agency’s Aviation Safety Program (AvSafe) in the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD). 
The IRAC Project, which was updated April 13, 2007, conducts research to advance the state of the 
aircraft flight control to provide onboard control resilience for ensuring safe flight in the presence of 
adverse conditions (faults, damage, and upsets). Adverse events include loss of control (LOC) caused by 
environmental factors and actuator and sensor faults or failures, and will expand toward more 
complicated damage conditions (Ref. 1).  
The purpose of this study is to review statistical data and literature from academia, industry, and other 
Government agencies to interpret and extract information about causal factors for aircraft incidents and 
accidents that are related to the key research areas in IRAC. From this information, a list of potential 
adverse conditions and initial test conditions was established against which IRAC technologies can be 
evaluated (Ref. 1). Outcomes of this study include 
 
(1) A report that documents causal factors related to LOC gleaned from the analysis of the incidents 
and accidents related to IRAC. 
(2) A list of potential adverse conditions and initial test conditions against which flight, propulsion, 
and mission adaptive control approaches can be evaluated. 
 
The results of this study are considered a “waypoint” to establish future requirements for the project.  
1.2 Overview of Study Contents 
The expected outcomes for this study are addressed in sequential order. Outcome 1 is addressed in the 
NASA Analyses of National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Accident Data and Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) Incident Data as well as the NASA Analysis of Aviation Safety Reporting System 
(ASRS) Incident Data sections. Outcome 2 is the focus of the adverse conditions table section. Finally, 
discussion and the conclusions that have been drawn are provided. Appendix A lists the acronyms used in 
this report and their definitions, and Appendix B presents accidents for Part 121 and Scheduled Part 135 
flight operations that were determined to include in-flight LOC.  
2.0 NASA Analysis of National Transportation Safety Board and Federal 
Aviation Administration Accident and Incident Data 
The first expected outcome of this study is a report that documents the results of an examination of 
the most recent statistical and prognostic incident and accident data that is available to determine the 
causal factors related to LOC in U.S. commercial aviation accidents and incidents. This section contains 
the results of two separate statistical analyses that have been conducted by NASA to address this expected 
outcome. The first statistical analysis examined publicly available NTSB and FAA accident and incident 
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data. A second statistical analysis was conducted using ASRS reports as the data source. All of these data 
sources can be accessed using the FAA’s Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) 
System (Ref. 2). 
In-flight loss of aircraft control contributed to less than 20 percent of U.S. aviation accidents between 
1988 and 2004, but these accidents were responsible for more than half of the aviation fatalities during 
that time period. The current analysis has examined the causes of LOC events across a 17-yr span (1988 
to 2004) within the four categories of operation (Part 121, Scheduled Part 135, Nonscheduled Part 135, 
and Part 91). In this analysis, “commercial” is defined as Part 121, Scheduled Part 135, and Nonscheduled 
Part 135 flights. Part 121 operations applies to major airlines and cargo carriers that fly large transport-
category aircraft, and Part 135 applies to commercial aircraft air carriers commonly referred to as 
commuter airlines. Prior to March 1997, Part 121 operations included aircraft with 30 or more seats. In 
March 1997, the definition of Part 121 operations changed and now includes those aircraft with 10 or 
more seats. Scheduled operation refers to “any common carriage passenger-carrying operation for 
compensation or hire conducted by an air carrier or commercial operator for which the certificate holder 
or its representative offers in advance the departure location, departure time, and arrival location” (Ref. 
3).  A nonscheduled operation refers to “any operation for compensation or hire in which the departure 
time, departure location, and arrival location are specifically negotiated with the customer.” Part 91, also 
known as general aviation, refers to all aviation other than commercial (Ref. 3). The word “event” is used 
here to encompass both accidents and incidents that are defined as follows (Ref. 4):  
 
Accident an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft, which takes place between the 
time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight and all such persons have 
disembarked, and in which any person suffers death or serious injury, or in which the 
aircraft receives substantial damage. 
 
Incident an occurrence other than an accident, associated with the operation of an aircraft, which 
affects or could affect the safety of operations. 
 
The source for accident data is the NTSB Aviation Accident and Incident Data System, and the 
source for incident data is the FAA’s Accident/Incident Data System. Although both databases contain 
both accident and incident data, the FAA has primary investigative responsibility for incidents and the 
NTSB is the authority for accident investigation. Appendix B lists all the accidents for Part 121 and 
Scheduled Part 135 flight operations that were determined to include in-flight LOC in this study.  
The accident data have previously been classified using the Commercial Aviation Safety Team/ 
International Civil Aviation Organization (CAST/ICAO) Common Taxonomy Team (CICTT) accident 
category taxonomy (Ref. 5). This taxonomy delineates LOC as being in-flight or on-ground. In-flight 
LOC was subsequently partitioned by general phase of flight (i.e., takeoff, approach/landing, or en route). 
Selection of LOC events from the incident data was accomplished using two methods. First, if in the 
data record, “FLTCNTL/AIR” was a primary or secondary cause, and second, if the words “control,” 
“stall,” or “spin” were found in the narrative text. All of these records were reviewed; more than 
95 percent were excluded. In a large percentage of the records with the word “control” in the text, that 
word was used in the context of specific flight controls, traffic control, or command of the aircraft (e.g., 
“the first officer was at the controls”). These were excluded, as were those involving on-ground or 
ground-effect LOC. Ground-effect LOC includes runway contact events (hard or bounced landings or 
wing, propeller, or tail strikes), undershoots, overruns, and runway excursions, and collisions with runway 
signs, markers, or lights. Essentially, the incidents included in this analysis occurred after flight was 
established in the takeoff climb and prior to the landing flare or during an aborted landing. This is 
consistent with the accident taxonomy. 
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A summary of the number of LOC events can be found in Table 1. Data for total flight hours were 
obtained from tables published by the NTSB, which they based on data from the FAA. In Part 121 flights, 
LOC contributed to only 4 percent of all accidents, but 34 percent of fatal accidents, and 55 percent of all 
fatalities. Eighty percent of the LOC accidents were fatal. Fifty-seven percent of Part 91 fatalities (and 
55 percent of fatal accidents) were attributed to loss of aircraft control, and 53 percent of the LOC 
accidents were fatal. Among Part 135 accidents, LOC accounted for 15 to 18 percent of all accidents, 39 
to 44 percent of fatal accidents, and 41 to 49 percent of all fatalities. Sixty to sixty-four percent of Part 
135 LOC accidents were fatal. 
 
TABLE 1.—SUMMARY OF LOSS OF CONTROL (LOC) EVENT CHARACTERISTICS BY OPERATION CATEGORY 
Type of events 
Operation category 
Part 121 Scheduled 
Part 135 
Nonscheduled 
Part 135 
Part 91 Part 91, 135, and 
121 combined 
Total flight hours 251,751,143 25,353,146 49,588,000 441,207,000 767,896,289 
Total accidents 630 217 1115 24,473 26,435 
LOC accidents 26 (4% of total 
accidents) 
32 (15% of total 
accidents) 
198 (18% of total 
accidents) 
4961 (20% of total 
accidents) 
5217 (20% of total 
accidents) 
LOC accidents 
per million flight 
hours 
0.10 1.26 4.03 11.24 6.79 
Fatal accidents 62 (10% of 
total accidents) 
49 (23% of total 
accidents) 
293 (26% of total 
accidents) 
4815 (20% of total 
accidents) 
5289 (20% of total 
accidents) 
Fatal LOC 
accidents 
21 (81% of 
LOC accidents) 
19 (59% of LOC 
accidents) 
128 (65% of LOC 
accidents) 
2635 (53% of 
LOC accidents) 
2803 (54% of 
LOC accidents) 
Total fatalities 2165 328 698 9146 12,337 
Fatalities in LOC 
accidents 
1186 (55%) 161 (49%) 285 (41%) 5178 (57%) 6810 (55%) 
Total incidents 7808 2234 2201 29,520 41,763 
LOC incidents 38  5  8  81  132 
LOC incidents per 
million flight 
hours 
0.151 0.197 0.161 0.18 0.17 
 
 
In-flight LOC was considered a factor in less than 0.5 percent of all incidents. Twenty-nine percent of 
the LOC incidents occurred in Part 121 flights, and 61 percent were in Part 91. Part 121 is the only flight 
category with more LOC incidents than accidents. Outside of transport category aircraft, LOC is likely to 
result in a level of aircraft damage that will cause the event to be considered an accident, rather than an 
incident. In most of these incidents, control of the aircraft was regained prior to a collision with terrain or 
objects. 
Since 1988, there have been no more than eight LOC events each year in Part 121 flights, and about 
60 percent of those were incidents (see Fig. 1). From 1997 to 2004, there were a total of 7 LOC accidents 
and 21 incidents. 
With the exception of 1992, there have been no more than five LOC events each year in Scheduled 
Part 135 flights, but about 82 percent of the events were accidents (see Fig. 2). Seventy percent of the 
events occurred prior to 1997. 
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Figure 1.—Frequency of Part 121 loss of control events per year. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.—Frequency of Scheduled Part 135 loss of control events per year. 
 
Between 1988 and 2004, there were no more than 16 LOC events each year in Nonscheduled 
Part 135 flights (see Fig. 3). The number of events has been generally decreasing over time, with a slight 
bump in 2004. 
LOC events in Part 91 have declined dramatically from 1988 to 2004 (see Fig. 4), but there are still 
more than 200 events each year. Nearly all of the Part 91 LOC events are considered accidents. 
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Figure 3.—Frequency of Nonscheduled Part 135 loss of control events per year. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.—Frequency of Part 91 loss of control events per year. 
 
Table 2 shows the delineation of in-flight LOC accidents according to the phase of flight in which 
control was lost. In Part 121, the largest percentage of LOC events occurred during approach and landing, 
but takeoff LOC was the deadliest. In Part 135, LOC was least likely to occur en route, although among 
Nonscheduled Part 135, when control was lost en route, it almost always resulted in fatalities. In Part 91, 
en-route LOC was both the most frequent and the most often fatal. 
 
TABLE 2.—FREQUENCY OF LOSS OF CONTROL ACCIDENTS 
BY PHASE OF FLIGHT AND BY OPERATION CATEGORY 
Phase of flight 
Operation category 
Part 121 Scheduled 
Part 135 
Nonscheduled 
Part 135 
Part 91 Part 91, 135, and 121 
combined 
Total accidents 26 32 198 4961 5217 
Takeoff 7 16 73 1542 1638 
Fatal takeoff 7 (100%) 7 (443.8%) 30 (41%) 526 (34%) 570 (35%) 
En route 8 6 56 1784 1854 
Fatal en route 5 (62%) 4 (67%) 52 (93%) 1459 (82%) 1520 (82%) 
Approach/landing 11 10 69 1635 1725 
Fatal approach/landing 9 (82%) 8 (80%) 46 (67%) 650 (40%) 713 (41%) 
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2.1 Types of Loss of Control Events 
To facilitate the examination of causal factors in these LOC accidents, the accidents and incidents 
were divided into three groups, which are defined below. 
 
1. LOC secondary to system/component failure/malfunction (SCFM).—In each of these events, 
LOC occurred secondary to a failure/malfunction. In some of these events, it may have been 
possible for the flight crew to maintain control, but in others the LOC was unavoidable. 
2. LOC secondary to aircraft damage.—In these events, LOC was secondary to some type of 
aircraft damage, and this group is further subdivided into the following causes of damage: 
 
 Fire and/or explosion 
 Mid-air collision with another aircraft, bird, or skydiver 
 Weather-induced damage (from turbulence, hail, or lightning) 
 Pilot induced (most often exceeding the designed stress limits of the aircraft) 
 
3. Control upset.—These events are further subdivided according to coexisting situations. 
 
 Pilot induced.—Control was lost due to the actions or inaction of the pilot, without other 
preceding or concurrent events. 
 Low-altitude operations.—In these accidents, control was lost in conjunction with some 
type of low-level maneuvering (aerobatics, aerial application, banner towing, evasive 
maneuvers to avoid a collision, sightseeing, scud running, etc.).  
 Severe weather.—In these events, the LOC was secondary to an encounter with severe 
weather—icing, turbulence, thunderstorm, or wind shear—or to inadequate ice/frost/snow 
removal prior to takeoff. 
 Other events.—The other events include loss of engine power, pilot incapacitation, or 
inadequate preflight inspections that resulted in open doors, gust locks that were not removed, 
or compromised Pitot systems. 
 
Table 3 shows 31 percent of these accidents were precipitated by an SCFM, 23 percent by damage to 
the aircraft, while 46 percent followed an event that caused control upset. The one en-route LOC accident 
that is considered to be secondary to pilot-induced damage is the Belle Harbor, New York, crash in which 
the pilot inappropriately manipulated the rudder controls, leading to an overload failure of the vertical 
stabilizer. The one approach/landing LOC accident secondary to other events involved an inadequate 
preflight (open baggage door) and the subsequent failure to make a successful precautionary landing after 
takeoff. 
 
TABLE 3.—FREQUENCY OF PART 121 LOSS OF CONTROL (LOC) 
ACCIDENTS BY ADVERSE CONDITIONS AND BY PHASE OF FLIGHT 
Adverse condition leading to LOC 
Phase of flight when LOC occurred 
Takeoff En route Approach/landing Takeoff, en route, and 
approach/landing 
combined 
Total system/component failure/ 
malfunction 
2 (29%) 1 (12%) 5 (46%) 8 (31%) 
Damage, fire 1  2  2  5  
Damage, pilot 0  1  0  1  
Total damage 1 3 (38%) 2 (18%) 6 (23%) 
Control upset, pilot 2  2  1  5  
Control upset, severe weather 2  2  2  6  
Control upset, other events 0  0  1  1  
Total control upset 4 (57%) 4 (50%) 4 (36%) 12 (46%) 
Total 7 (100%) 8 (100%) 11 (100%) 26 (100%) 
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Among Scheduled Part 135 accidents during 1988 to 2004, there were 16 events with LOC during 
takeoff climb, 6 events with en-route LOC, and 10 events with LOC during approach or landing. Table 4 
shows that 9 percent of these accidents were precipitated by an SCFM, 1 percent was attributed to 
damage, and 88 percent followed encounters with a control upset. Severe weather was a cause in 38 
percent of all the Scheduled Part 135 LOC accidents. The two cases of control upset due to other events 
during takeoff involved an unsecured door and wake turbulence. The LOC accident due to pilot-induced 
damage during approach/landing involved scraping the aircraft on the runway following a failure to 
extend the landing gear, with a stall during the improperly executed aborted landing. 
 
TABLE 4.—FREQUENCY OF SCHEDULED PART 135 LOSS OF CONTROL (LOC) 
ACCIDENTS BY ADVERSE CONDITIONS AND BY PHASE OF FLIGHT 
Adverse condition leading to LOC 
Phase of flight when LOC occurred 
Takeoff En route 
 
Approach/landing Takeoff, en route, and 
approach/landing 
combined 
Total system/component failure/ 
malfunction 
1 (6%) 1 (17%) 1 (10%) 3 (9%) 
Total damage, pilot 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (10%) 1 (3%) 
Control upset, pilot 7  2  4  13  
Control upset, low-altitude maneuver 0 1  0 6  
Control upset, severe weather 6  2  4  12 (38%) 
Control upset, other events 2  0 0 2 
Total control upset 15 (94%) 5 (83%) 8 (80%) 28 (88%) 
Total 16 (100%) 6 (100%) 10 (100%) 32 (100%) 
 
Among Nonscheduled Part 135 accidents during 1988 to 2004, there were 73 events with LOC on 
takeoff climb, 56 events with en-route LOC, and 69 events with LOC during approach or landing. As 
shown in Table 5, 12 percent of these accidents were precipitated by an SCFM. Of the en-route LOC 
events, 23 percent followed some sort of aircraft damage, and 25 percent occurred while operating at low 
altitude. Approximately 22 percent of the LOC events followed encounters with severe weather. One of 
the takeoff LOC due to other events involved an open door, and the other two had a loss of engine power. 
Of the two en-route LOC due to other events, one followed pilot incapacitation, and the other had a loss 
of engine power. One of the landing LOC due to other events involved an inadequate preflight (engine 
cowl plugs not removed), another followed pilot incapacitation, and eight had loss of engine power. 
 
 
TABLE 5.—FREQUENCY OF NONSCHEDULED PART 135 LOSS OF CONTROL (LOC) 
ACCIDENTS BY ADVERSE CONDITIONS AND BY PHASE OF FLIGHT 
Adverse condition leading to LOC 
Phase of flight when LOC occurred 
Takeoff En route Approach/landing Takeoff, en route, and 
approach/landing combined 
Total system/component failure/ 
malfunction 
11 (15%) 5 (9%) 8 (12%) 24 (12%) 
Damage, fire 0 2 1 3 
Damage, collision 0 6 0 6 
Damage, weather 0 4 0 4 
Damage, pilot 1 1 0 3 
Total damage 1 (1%) 13 (23%) 1 (1%) 15 (8%) 
Control upset, pilot 45 (62%) 12 (21%) 29 (42%) 86 (43%) 
Control upset, low-altitude maneuver 0 14 (25%) 0 14 
Control upset, severe weather 13 10 21 (31%) 44 (22%) 
Control upset, other events 3 2 10 15 
Total control upset 61(81%) 38 (67%) 60 (87%) 159 (80%) 
Total 73 (100%) 56 (100%) 69 (100%) 198 (100%) 
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Among Part 91 accidents during 1988 to 2004, there were 1542 events with LOC on takeoff climb, 
1784 events with en-route LOC, and 1635 events with LOC during approach or landing. As shown in 
Table 6, 8 percent of these accidents were precipitated by an SCFM, and 6 percent of them were 
secondary to aircraft damage. More than half were attributed to pilot error, while 7 percent followed an 
encounter with severe weather. Thirty-five percent of the en-route LOC accidents occurred while 
operating at low altitude. Thirty-three accidents had LOC secondary to pilot-induced damage. The two 
during takeoff followed a propeller strike shortly after liftoff and the nine during approach/landing 
followed failures to extend the landing gear. In the 22 en-route accidents, the pilot operated the aircraft in 
a manner that exceeded the designed stress limits. Thirty-nine of the 177 takeoff LOC accidents occurred 
due to other events involved an inadequate preflight (doors not secured, gust locks not removed, or Pitot 
tubes not cleared), 7 followed pilot incapacitation, 7 followed abrupt maneuvering, and 124 followed loss 
of engine power. Of the 106 en-route LOC accidents due to other events, 65 of these followed pilot 
incapacitation, 40 followed loss of engine power, and the final involved an inadequate preflight (open 
door). Of the 363 approach/landing LOC accidents due to other events, 316 followed loss of engine 
power, 19 followed pilot incapacitation, 14 involved inadequate preflight errors (relative to doors, fuel/oil 
caps, and Pitot systems), 9 involved evasive maneuvers, and the other 5 involved problems with banner 
towing equipment. 
 
TABLE 6.—FREQUENCY OF PART 91 LOSS OF CONTROL (LOC) ACCIDENTS BY PHASE OF 
FLIGHT AND ADVERSE CONDITIONS  
Adverse condition leading to LOC 
Phase of flight when LOC occurred 
Takeoff En route Approach/landing Takeoff, en route, and 
approach/landing combined 
Total system/component failure/ 
malfunction 
112 (7%) 114 (6%) 157 (10%) 383 (8%) 
Damage, fire 2 17 12 31 
Damage, collision 11 125 62 198 
Damage, weather 0 29 0 29 
Damage, pilot 2 22 9 33 
Total damage 15 (1%) 193 (11%) 83 (5%) 292 (6%) 
Control upset, pilot 1164 (76%) 572 (32%) 921 (56%) 2657 (53%) 
Control upset, low-altitude maneuver 0 620 0 620 
Control upset, severe weather 74 179 111 364 
Control upset, other events 177 106 363 646 
Total control upset 1415 1477 1395 4287 
Total 1542 (100%) 1784 (100%) 1635 (100%) 4961 (100%) 
 
Among Part 121 incidents during 1988 to 2004, there were 4 events with LOC during takeoff climb, 
25 events with en-route LOC, and 9 with LOC during approach or landing. As shown in Table 7, about 
79 percent of these events were precipitated by either a SCFM or damage to the aircraft, while 20 percent 
followed encounters with severe weather. The one approach/landing control upset incident that is 
considered to be due to other events involved wake turbulence. 
 
TABLE 7.—FREQUENCY OF PART 121 LOSS OF CONTROL (LOC) INCIDENTS BY PHASE OF 
FLIGHT AND ADVERSE CONDITIONS  
Adverse condition leading to LOC 
Phase of flight when LOC occurred 
Takeoff En route Approach/landing Takeoff, en route, and 
approach/landing combined 
Total system/component failure/ 
malfunction 
1  21 (84%) 6 (67%) 28 (58%) 
Control upset, pilot 1  0 0 1 
Control upset, severe weather 2  4  2  8 (20%) 
Control upset, other events 0 0 1  1 
Total control upset 3 4 3 10 (21%) 
Total 4 (100%) 25 (100%) 9 (100%) 48 (100%) 
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Among Scheduled Part 135 incidents during 1988 to 2004, there was one event with LOC during 
takeoff climb, and four events with en-route LOC (see Table 8). The one control upset incident that is 
considered to be due to other events involved wake turbulence. 
 
TABLE 8.—FREQUENCY OF SCHEDULED PART 135 LOSS OF CONTROL (LOC) INCIDENTS BY PHASE OF 
FLIGHT AND ADVERSE CONDITIONS  
Adverse condition leading to LOC 
Phase of flight when LOC occurred 
Takeoff En route Approach/landing Takeoff, en route, and 
approach/landing combined 
Total system/component failure/ 
malfunction 
1 (100%) 2 (50%) 0 3 (60%) 
Control upset, severe weather 0 1 0 1 
Control upset, other events 0 1 0 1 
Total control upset 0 2 (100%) 0 2 (40%) 
Total 1 (100%) 4 (100%) 0 5 (100%) 
 
 
Among Nonscheduled Part 135 incidents during 1988 to 2004, there were two events with LOC 
during takeoff climb, and six events with en-route LOC. As shown in Table 9, 75 percent of 
these events were precipitated by an SCFM. 
 
TABLE 9.—FREQUENCY OF NONSCHEDULED PART 135 LOSS OF CONTROL (LOC) INCIDENTS BY PHASE OF 
FLIGHT AND ADVERSE CONDITIONS 
Adverse condition leading to LOC 
Phase of flight when LOC occurred 
Takeoff En route Approach/landing Takeoff, en route, and 
approach/landing combined 
Total system/component failure/ 
malfunction 
1 (50%) 5 (83%) 0 6 (75%) 
Control upset, pilot 1 0 0 1 
Control upset, severe weather 0 1 0 1 
Total control upset 1 (50%) 1 (17%) 0 2 (25%) 
Total 2 (00%) 6 (100%) 0 8 (100%) 
 
Among Part 91 incidents during 1988 to 2004, there were 18 events with LOC during takeoff climb, 
35 events with en-route LOC, and 28 events with LOC during approach or landing, as shown in Table 10. 
One-third of these events were precipitated by an SCFM, while 15 percent followed encounters with 
severe weather. Four of the six incidents that are considered to be due to other events involved a loss of 
engine power; the other two had inadequate preflights (an inspection panel came loose and a door 
opened). 
 
TABLE 10.—FREQUENCY OF PART 91 LOSS OF CONTROL (LOC) INCIDENTS BY PHASE OF 
FLIGHT AND ADVERSE CONDITIONS 
Adverse condition leading to LOC 
Phase of flight when LOC occurred 
Takeoff En route Approach/landing Takeoff, en route, and 
approach/landing combined 
Total system/component failure/ 
malfunction 
4 (22%) 19 (54%) 4 (14%) 27 (33%) 
Control upset, pilot 11 5 20 36 (44%) 
Control upset, severe weather 1 9 2 12 (15%) 
Control upset, other events 2 2 2 6 
Total control upset 14 (78%) 16 (46%) 24 (86%) 54 (67%) 
Total 18 (100%) 35 (100%) 28 (100%) 81 (100%) 
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2.2 Causes of Loss of Control, Secondary to System/Component Failure/Malfunction 
(SCFM) 
For LOC accidents in which SCFM was a cause, Tables 11 to 14 give more detailed information as to 
the specific system that suffered the SCFM. Table 11 provides this information for all phases of flight 
combined, while Tables 12 through 14 breaks out this information into the three phases of flight looked at 
in this study: takeoff, en route, and approach/landing.  
As shown in Table 11, in Part 121, of the eight LOC accidents, 62 percent involved flight control 
systems. Of these Part 121 LOC accidents, aircraft control was not possible in five out of the eight 
accidents, improper procedures were used in one accident (landing gear malfunction), spatial 
disorientation occurred in another (navigation instrument malfunction), and the data record does not 
specify a cause for LOC in the other accident (a catastrophic and uncontained engine failure). In the 
NTSB data analysis, “flight controls” as a category of SCFM, refers to the entire flight control system, 
including ailerons, elevators, rudder, horizontal and vertical stabilizers, and the control stick or yoke. 
Most of these are failures of connections, cables, screws, and fatigue cracks. Failures of the autopilot and 
flight management computer are classified as being a part of the navigation system by the NTSB. 
In Scheduled Part 135 flights, three LOC accidents followed SCFMs. Aircraft control was not 
possible in two of these accidents, and in the third, the pilot did not follow the proper emergency 
procedure following an engine failure. 
 
TABLE 11.—SYSTEM/COMPONENT FAILURE/MALFUNCTION (SCFM) FREQUENCY IN 
LOSS OF CONTROL (LOC) ACCIDENTS BY SYSTEM AND OPERATION CATEGORY  
SCFM system 
Operation category 
Part 121 Scheduled 
Part 135 
Nonscheduled 
Part 135 
Part 91 Part 91, 135, 
and 121 
combined 
Anti-ice/de-ice 0 0 0 2 2 
Electrical 0 0 3 12 15 
Engine 1 1 (33%) 11 (46%) 146 (38%) 159 (38%) 
Flight control 5 (62%) 1 (33%) 2 78 (20%) 86 (21%) 
Fuel system 0 0 3 39 42 (10%) 
Heating 0 0 0 1 1 
Inst/com/nav 1 0 0 23 24 
Landing gear 1 0 0 6 7 
Oxygen 0 0 0 2  2 
Pitot heat 0 0 0 1  1 
Pressurization 0 0 1  2  3 
Propeller 0 1 (33%) 1 20 22 
Structure 0 0 1  30 31 
Vacuum pump 0 0 2 21 23 
Total 8 (100%) 3 (100%) 24 (100%) 383 (100%) 418 (100%) 
 
In Nonscheduled Part 135 flights, 24 LOC accidents followed SCFMs. Fourteen of these involved the 
engine or fuel system; in 12 of these, a loss of airspeed led to a stall, while for the other 2 accidents, the 
cause of the LOC was not specified. In six of the accidents, the NTSB ruled that the loss of aircraft 
control could not have been prevented, including one accident in which all persons onboard were 
incapacitated following decompression. In the remaining four accidents, the LOC was caused by spatial 
disorientation (two accidents, both vacuum pump failures), diverted attention because of the electrical 
failure during takeoff, and a stall (from ice buildup because the anti-ice system could not operate due to 
an electrical malfunction). 
In Part 91 flights, 383 LOC accidents followed SCFM, 185 involved the engine or fuel system, and 
78 involved flight control systems. The engine/fuel system and flight control systems accounted for 
69 percent of Part 91 LOC accidents. 
As shown in Table 12, of all LOC takeoff accidents following an SCFM, 40 percent followed an 
SCFM of the engine, while 33 percent followed an SCFM of flight control. In en-route LOC accidents, 
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the most frequent SCFM systems were structures, flight control, and the engine, as shown in Table 13. 
During approach/landing LOC accidents, an engine SCFM preceded LOC in a majority of the accidents 
(Table 14). 
 
TABLE 12.—SYSTEM/COMPONENT FAILURE/MALFUNCTION (SCFM) FREQUENCY IN LOSS OF 
CONTROL (LOC) ACCIDENTS DURING TAKEOFF BY SYSTEM AND OPERATION CATEGORY  
SCFM system 
Operation category 
Part 121 Scheduled 
Part 135 
Nonscheduled 
Part 135 
Part 91 Part 91, 135, 
and 121 
combined 
Electrical 0 0 1 1 2 
Engine 0 1 (100%) 6 (54%) 43 (38%) 50 (40%) 
Flight control 2 (100%) 0 1 39 (35%) 42 (33%) 
Fuel system 0 0 2 12 14 
Inst/com/nav 0 0 0 1 1 
Landing gear 0 0 0 3 3 
Propeller 0 0 1 7 8 
Structure 0 0 0 6 6 
Total 2 (100%) 1 (100%) 11 (100%) 112 (100%) 126 (100%) 
 
 
TABLE 13.—SYSTEM/COMPONENT FAILURE/MALFUNCTION (SCFM) FREQUENCY IN LOSS OF CONTROL 
(LOC) ACCIDENTS WHILE EN ROUTE BY SYSTEM AND OPERATION CATEGORY  
SCFM system 
Operation category 
Part 121 Scheduled Part 135 Nonscheduled 
Part 135 
Part 91 Part 91, 135, and 121 
combined 
Anti-ice/de-ice 0 0 0 1 1 
Electrical 0 0 1 6 7 
Engine 0 0 1 18 (16%) 19 (16%) 
Flight control 1 1 0 19 (17%) 21 (17%) 
Fuel system 0 0 0 6 6 
Inst/com/nav 0 0 0 16 (14%) 16 
Oxygen 0 0 0 2 2 
Pitot heat 0 0 0 1 1 
Pressurization 0 0 1 2 3 
Propeller 0 0 0 2 2 
Structure 0 0 1 21 (18%) 22 (18%) 
Vacuum pump 0 0 1 20 (18%) 21 
Total 1 (100%) 1 (100%) 5 (100%) 114 (100%) 121 (100%) 
 
 
TABLE 14.—SYSTEM/COMPONENT FAILURE/MALFUNCTION (SCFM) FREQUENCY IN LOSS OF CONTROL 
(LOC) ACCIDENTS DURING APPROACH/LANDING BY SYSTEM AND SYSTEM AND OPERATION CATEGORY  
SCFM system 
Operation category 
Part 121 Scheduled Part 135 Nonscheduled 
Part 135 
Part 91 Part 91, 135, and 121 
combined 
Anti-ice/de-ice 0 0 0 1 1 
Electrical 0 0 1 5 6 
Engine 1 0 4 85 (54%) 90 (53%) 
Flight control 2 0 1 20 23 
Fuel system 0 0 1 21 22 
Heating 0 0 0 1 1 
Inst/com/nav 1 0 0 6 7 
Landing gear 1 0 0 3 4 
Propeller 0 1  0 11 12 
Structure 0 0 0 3 3 
Vacuum pump 0 0 1 1 2 
Total 5 (100%) 1 (100%)  8 (100%)  157 (100%)  171 (100%) 
 
NASA/TM—2010-216261 13 
In LOC accidents following an SCFM, the most common primary causes of the LOC were 
“inadequate airspeed and/or stall/spin” and “control was not possible” (Table 15). In 80 percent of the 
SCFM accidents the LOC due to inadequate airspeed and/or spin/stall was as a result of an engine or fuel 
SCFM. 
 
TABLE 15.—FREQUENCY OF PRIMARY CAUSES OF PART 91 LOSS OF CONTROL (LOC) ACCIDENTS 
SECONDARY TO SYSTEM/COMPONENT FAILURE/MALFUNCTION BY SYSTEM  
Primary cause of LOC 
System 
Engine or fuel Flight control Other systems All systems 
combined 
Control not possible 5 62 (80%) 40 (33%) 107 (28%) 
Inadequate airspeed and/or stall/spin 149 (80%) 6 26 (22%) 181 (47%) 
Spatial disorientation 0 0 26 (22%) 26 
Pilot incapacitation 7 0 4 11 
Diverted attention 5 1 5 11 
Procedural or decision errors 8 0 4 12 
Not specified 11 9 15 35 
Total 185 (100%) 78 (100%) 120 (100%) 383 (100%) 
 
2.3 Causes of Loss of Control, Secondary to Aircraft Damage 
In Part 121, six LOC accidents followed aircraft damage. Aircraft control was not possible in four of 
these accidents (67 percent), and the data record does not specify a cause for LOC in the other two 
accidents that occurred outside the United States in the Dominican Republic and Ecuador. 
In Scheduled Part 135, one LOC accident followed aircraft damage. As mentioned above, the pilot 
failed to extend the landing gear and scraped the aircraft along the runway, then stalled the aircraft during 
the improperly executed aborted landing. 
In Nonscheduled Part 135, 15 LOC accidents followed aircraft damage. Airspeed was not maintained 
after an engine fire, resulting in a stall. In two other fires, the data record does not specify the cause for 
the LOC. Six of the accidents were mid-air collisions with other aircraft, after which aircraft control was 
not possible. Four in-flight breakups occurred after encounters with severe weather, leaving the aircraft 
uncontrollable. Another in-flight breakup was caused by the pilot flying with excessive airspeed, after 
which aircraft control was not possible. In the final accident, the pilot did not maintain proper alignment 
on the gravel bar he was using as a runway and damaged the stabilator by hitting a tree. The aircraft then 
stalled into the river. Of these accidents, LOC was caused because aircraft control not possible in 11 of 
the accidents, stall in 2, and unknown causes in the final 2 accidents. 
In Part 91, 291 LOC accidents followed aircraft damage and the NTSB ruled that aircraft control was 
not possible in 251 of these (86 percent). Table 16 lists the causes of LOC in four groups defined by the 
cause of the damage. 
 
TABLE 16.—FREQUENCY OF PRIMARY CAUSES OF PART 91 LOSS OF CONTROL (LOC) 
ACCIDENTS SECONDARY TO AIRCRAFT DAMAGE  
Primary cause of LOC 
Cause of aircraft damage 
Fire Collision Weather Pilot induced All causes 
combined 
Control not possible 18 (58%) 181 (91%) 29 (100%) 23 (70%) 251 (86%) 
Inadequate airspeed 
and/or stall/spin 
2  2  0 6  10 
Spatial disorientation 1  0 0 0 1 
Pilot incapacitation or 
impairment 
2  7  0 0 9 
Diverted attention 2  7  0  9 
Not specified 6  1  0 4  11 
Total 31 (100%) 198 (100%) 29 (100%) 33 (100%) 291 (100%) 
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2.4 Causes of Control Upset 
Control upset is defined here as being caused by pilot error and/or LOC due to occurrences that 
cannot be regulated via aircraft technology. In Part 121, 12 accidents were classified as “control upset.” 
Three accidents followed in-flight encounters with icing, and two followed inadequate ice and/or frost 
removal before takeoff. Each of the following primary causes was responsible for one of the seven 
remaining accidents: inaccurate weight and/or balance (cargo loaded improperly), improper use of 
controls (flaps and slats not properly configured prior to takeoff), inadvertent control interference 
(deactivation of autopilot and movement of control column), an inadvertent stall from inadequate airspeed 
during level-off, a wind shear encounter during a missed approach, impairment of the flight crew due to 
fatigue, and an improperly secured cargo door.  
In Scheduled Part 135, 28 accidents were classified as “control upset.” Six accidents were caused by 
inadequate ice and/or frost removal prior to takeoff. The primary causes of the other nine takeoff control 
upset accidents were three stalls from inadequate airspeed, one encounter with wake turbulence, one 
encounter with adverse winds (downdrafts), one premature liftoff from a wet runway, one improper 
decision to delay aborting the takeoff after the aircraft would not climb, one spatial disorientation during a 
low-visibility takeoff at night, and one inadequate preflight (improperly secured cargo door). Of the five 
en-route control upset accidents, one has no determined cause, one followed an encounter with icing, one 
followed an encounter with a thunderstorm, one was caused by spatial disorientation (flat lighting and 
snow-covered terrain), and the other was caused by an inadvertent stall from inadequate airspeed. There 
were eight control upset accidents during approach/landing. Two followed icing encounters, one followed 
an encounter with a thunderstorm, three were due to stalls, one was caused by the pilot’s failure to follow 
approved procedures for a single-engine approach, and one was caused by the improper use of controls 
(inadvertent activation of power levers). 
The primary causes of the control upset accidents in Nonscheduled Part 135 and Part 91 are listed in 
Tables 17, 18, and 19. In some cases the data record does not include any causes or factors (mostly for 
accidents occurring outside the United States). In other cases the only cause listed is a “failure to maintain 
aircraft control.” This cause has no more meaning than “unknown,” but when the aircraft is not equipped 
with a cockpit recorder, when the pilot was not in communication with a tower at the time of the accident, 
and when there are no witnesses to the accident, a more detailed accident cause is understandably difficult 
to determine. 
During takeoff, control upset in Nonscheduled Part 135 was most likely to be caused by adverse 
winds or inadequate ice/frost removal, and in Part 91, 40 percent of the control upset was caused by 
inadequate airspeed leading to a stall. En route, the most common cause of control upset in either 
category of operation was a stall. The next most common causes of control upset were icing (Part 135 
Nonscheduled) and visual flight rules (VFR) into instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) (Part 91). 
During approach and landing, the most common cause of control upset in either category of operation was 
also a stall. The next most common causes were icing (Part 135 Nonscheduled) and adverse wind 
conditions (Part 91). 
 
 
TABLE 17.—FREQUENCY OF PRIMARY CAUSES OF NONSCHEDULED PART 135 AND PART 91 LOSS OF CONTROL 
(LOC) ACCIDENTS DURING TAKEOFF FOLLOWING CONTROL UPSET  
Primary cause of LOC Operation 
Nonscheduled Part 135 Part 91 
Inadequate airspeed and/or stall 5 575 (40.6%) 
Inadequate ice/frost removal 13 (21.3%) 33 
Weather (WX), icing 0 4 
WX, thunderstorm 0 4 
WX, wind shear 0 21 
WX, adverse winds 18 (30%) 200 (14%) 
WX, obscuration 0 13 
Visual flight rules into instrument meteorological conditions 0 31 
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TABLE 17.—Concluded. 
Primary cause of LOC Operation Nonscheduled Part 135 Part 91 
Spatial disorientation 1 37 
Diverted attention 1 11 
Wake turbulence 0 7 
Inadequate preflight 2 48 
Incorrect weight/balance 8 64 
Incorrect or unsuitable runway 4 17 
All available runway not used 0 3 
Improper/premature liftoff 0 105 
Improper handling 0 5 
Improper use of controls 2 51 
Procedural or decision error 0 30 
Pilot incapacitation 0 7 
Pilot impairment 0 16 
Control interference 0 8 
Passenger interference 0 7 
Aircraft performance capability exceeded 0 28 
Lack of experience 0 16 
Aircraft control not maintained 5 58 
Unknown 2 16  
Total 61 (100%) 1415 (100%) 
 
 
TABLE 18.—FREQUENCY OF PRIMARY CAUSES OF NONSCHEDULED PART 135 AND PART 91 LOSS OF CONTROL 
(LOC) ACCIDENTS EN ROUTE FOLLOWING CONTROL UPSET  
Primary cause of LOC 
Operation 
Nonscheduled Part 135 Part 91 
Inadequate airspeed and/or stall 10 (26%) 530 (36%) 
Weather (WX), icing 5 (13%) 63 
WX, thunderstorm 3 68 
WX,  turbulence 2 29 
WX, wind shear 0 8 
WX, adverse winds 0 33 
WX, obscuration 0 50 
WX, blizzard 1 0 
Visual flight rules into instrument meteorological conditions 2 211 (14%) 
Spatial disorientation 3 95 
Diverted attention 0 6 
Wake turbulence 1 3 
Inadequate preflight 0 3 
Incorrect weight/balance 0 7 
Improper use of controls 0 12 
Low-altitude maneuvering 3 83 
Pilot incapacitation 0 63 
Pilot impairment 1 55 
Procedural/decision error 0 5 
Control interference 0 9 
Passenger interference 1 11 
Aircraft performance capability exceeded 0 2 
Lack of experience 0 14 
Aircraft control not maintained 1 72 
Unknown 5 45 
Total 38 (100%) 1477 (100%) 
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TABLE 19.—FREQUENCY OF PRIMARY CAUSES OF NONSCHEDULED PART 135 AND PART 91 LOSS OF CONTROL 
(LOC) ACCIDENTS DURING APPROACH OR LANDING FOLLOWING CONTROL UPSET 
Primary cause of LOC Operation Nonscheduled Part 135 Part 91 
Inadequate airspeed and/or stall 21 (35%) 675 (48.4%) 
Weather (WX), icing 11 (18%) 38 
WX, thunderstorm 3 4 
WX, wind shear 4 29 
WX, turbulence 0 2 
WX, adverse winds 3 267 (19%) 
WX, obscuration 6 20 
Visual flight rules into instrument meteorological conditions 0 18 
Spatial disorientation 1 52 
Diverted attention 0 8 
Wake turbulence 1 27 
Inadequate preflight 0 13 
Incorrect weight/balance 3 2 
Improper use of controls 2 54 
Improper handling 0 4 
Incorrect or unsuitable runway 0 1 
Procedural/decision error 0 33 
Pilot incapacitation 0 18 
Pilot impairment 1 12 
Control interference 1 0 
Passenger interference 0 2 
Aircraft performance capability exceeded 0 1 
Lack of experience 0 19 
Aircraft control not maintained 2 85 
Unknown 1 11 
Total 60 (100%) 1395 (100%) 
 
The incident data, unfortunately, seldom includes enough details to determine a cause for the LOC 
incidents. Thus no attempt is made to summarize causal factor data for the incidents. 
The accident data record often includes four or more causes, factors, or findings. In addition to the 
primary cause detailed above, Tables 20 to 22 list all of the recorded causes, factors, and findings relative 
to control upset for these accidents for takeoff, en route, and approach or landing phases of flight. 
Percentages are based on the total number of accidents in each operation category, not on the total number 
of causes, factors, or findings. For example, 51 percent of the Part 91 accidents with control upset during 
takeoff (1415 total accidents) list an inadvertent stall, spin, or mush as a cause/factor/finding in the data 
record. 
 
TABLE 20.—FREQUENCY OF ALL CAUSES/FACTORS/FINDINGS OF LOSS OF CONTROL UPSET 
ACCIDENTS DURING TAKEOFF FOLLOWING CONTROL UPSET BY OPERATION CATEGORY 
Causes/factors/findings 
Operation 
Part 121 Scheduled 
Part 135 
Nonscheduled 
Part 135 
 
Part 91 Part 91, 135, and 
121 combined 
Total number of accidents 4 15 61 1415 1495 
Inadvertent stall/spin/mush 2 (50%) 5 (33%) 13 (21%) 722 (51%) 742 (50%) 
Inadequate airspeed 1 (25%) 3 (20%) 15 (25%) 548 (39%) 567 (38%) 
Weather (WX), winds 0 1 19 (31%) 344 (24%) 364 (24%) 
Aircraft control not maintained 0 2 12 (20%) 302 (21%) 316 (21%) 
Inadequate preflight 2 (50%) 3 (20%) 17 (28%) 211 233 (16%) 
Inadequate experience 0 0 3 162 165 
Improper (premature) liftoff 0 1 0 158 159 
High-density altitude 0 0 1 158 159 
Improper or inadequate compensation 
for wind conditions 
0 1 8 132 141 
Improper use of controls 2 (50%) 1 3 131 137 
Incorrect weight/balance 1 (25%) 3 9 119 132 
Improper climb 0 1 2 88 91 
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TABLE 20.—Continued. 
Causes/factors/findings 
Part 121 Scheduled 
Part 135 
Nonscheduled 
Part 135 
 
Part 91 Part 91, 135, and 
121 combined 
WX, obscuration 0 1 4 73 78 
Wrong or unsuitable runway 0 0 4 74 78 
Light (night) 0 1 6 67 74 
Abort delayed or not performed 0 1 2 69 72 
Improper planning/decision 0 1 7 58 66 
Abrupt, evasive, or improperly executed 
maneuver 
0 0 1 62 63 
Spatial disorientation 0 0 1 58 59 
Inadequate WX evaluation 0 0 6 52 58 
Incapacitation or impairment 0 1 0 53 54 
Inadequate ice/frost removal 2 (50%) 6 (40%) 9 36 53 
Diverted attention 0 0 3 46 49 
Aircraft performance capability 
exceeded 
0 0 2 47 49 
Procedures and/or directives not 
followed 
2 (50%) 2 4 65 73 
Improper or inadequate supervision by 
certified flight instructor or pilot not 
flying 
0 0 0 38 38 
WX, icing 2 (50%) 2 8 25 37 
Improper aircraft handling 0 0 0 35 35 
Improper or inadequate remedial action 0 0 1 33 34 
Climb not possible 0 0 4 27 31 
Complacency, overconfidence, or 
ostentatious display 
1 (25%) 0 0 30 31 
Visual flight rules into instrument 
meteorological conditions 
0 0 0 31 31 
Runway condition 0 2 3 26 31 
WX, turbulence 0 0 1 29 30 
Checklist not followed 0 0 1 28 29 
WX, snow or rain 1 2 4 19 26 
Aircraft control not possible 1 (25.0%) 2 0 20 23 
Flight into adverse WX 0 0 1 22 23 
WX, wind shear 0 0 0 23 23 
Improper alignment 0 0 1 19 20 
Lack of certification or qualification 0 0 0 20 20 
No causes/factors/findings 0 0 3 16 19 
Company and/or operator deficiency 3 (75%) 3 (20%) 7 6 19 
Operation with known aircraft 
deficiency 
0 0 0 19 19 
Anxiety/depression/panic/pressure 0 1 1 16 18 
Improper altitude 0 1 0 16 17 
All available runway not used 0 0 0 15 15 
Improper or inadequate training 1 (25%) 0 1 13 15 
FAA deficiency 4 (100%) 2 1 7 14 
WX, thunderstorm or microburst 0 0 1 11 12 
Banner or glider tow flight 0 0 0 10 10 
Control interference 0 0 0 10 10 
Poor judgment 0 0 0 8 8 
Manufacturing deficiency 1 (25%) 1 0 6 8 
Fatigue 0 0 0 7 7 
Cargo shifted 0 0 2 5 7 
Wake turbulence 0 1 0 6 7 
Passenger interference 0 0 0 7 7 
Gust lock not removed 0 0 0 5 5 
Light (dusk or dawn) 0 0 0 5 5 
WX, high temperatures 0 0 0 4 4 
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TABLE 20.—Concluded. 
Causes/factors/findings 
Part 121 Scheduled 
Part 135 
Nonscheduled 
Part 135 
 
Part 91 Part 91, 135, and 
121 combined 
Improper or inadequate air traffic 
control service 
0 0 0 3 3 
Improper or inadequate communication 
with air traffic control 
0 0 0 2 2 
Light (sun glare) 0 0 0 2 2 
Visual/aural perception 0 0 0 2 2 
Light (flat) 0 0 1 0 1 
Inadequate crew coordination 1 (25%) 0 0 0 1 
 
TABLE 21.—FREQUENCY OF ALL CAUSES/FACTORS/FINDINGS OF LOSS OF CONTROL (LOC) ACCIDENTS 
EN ROUTE FOLLOWING CONTROL UPSET BY OPERATION CATEGORY 
Causes/factors/findings 
Operation 
Part 121 Scheduled 
Part 135 
Nonscheduled 
Part 135 
Part 91 Part 121, 135, 
and 91 combined 
Total number of accidents 4 5 38 1477 1524 
Inadvertent stall/spin/mush 2 (50%) 2 (40%) 12 (32%) 644 (44%) 660 (43%) 
Aircraft control not maintained 1 (25%) 2 (40%) 12 (32%) 478 (32%) 493 (32%) 
Inadequate airspeed 2 (50%) 2 (40%) 13 (34.2%) 451 
(30.5%) 
468 (31%) 
Weather (WX), obscuration 0 0 9 (24%) 360 (24%) 369 (24%) 
Abrupt, evasive, or improperly 
executed maneuver 
0 0 7  295 (20%) 302 (20%) 
Spatial disorientation 0 1 (20%) 4  269  274  
Inadequate experience 0 0 4  246  250  
Visual flight rules into instrument 
meteorological conditions 
0 1 (20%) 3  223 227 
Light (night) 0 0 8 (21%) 183  191 
Flight into adverse weather 0 0 4  181  185 
Improper planning/decision 0 1 (20%) 6  168  175  
Incapacitation or impairment 0 0 5  163  168 
WX, snow or rain 0 2 (40%) 4  131  137 
Inadequate WX evaluation 0 0 5  125  130 
WX, icing 2 (50%) 2 (40%) 7 96 107 
WX, turbulence 0 1 (20%) 2  106 109 
WX, winds 0 0 3  102  105 
WX, thunderstorm/microburst 0 1 (20%) 4  83 88 
Inadequate preflight 0 0 1  73 74 
Improper or inadequate remedial 
action 
1 (25%) 0 1 68  70 
Complacency or overconfidence 0 0 0 64 64 
Improper or inadequate aircraft 
handling 
0 0 1 58 59 
High-density altitude 0 0 1 53 54 
No causes/factors/findings  1 (20%) 4  44  49 
Procedures/directives not followed 0 0 2 47 49 
Improper use of controls 2 (50%) 1 (20%)  44  47 
Incorrect weight/balance 0 0 0 44 44 
Improper or inadequate supervision 
by certified flight instructor or pilot 
not flying 
0 0 0 40 40 
Improper altitude 0 0 1 36 37 
Diverted attention 0 1 (20%)  35 36 
Anger/anxiety/depression/panic/ 
pressure 
0 0 2 34 36 
Poor judgment 0 0 0 31 31 
Lack of certification or qualification 0 0 0 29 29 
Ostentatious display 0 0 0 28  28 
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TABLE 21.—Concluded. 
Causes/factors/findings 
Operation 
Part 121 Scheduled 
Part 135 
Nonscheduled 
Part 135 
Part 91 Part 121, 135, 
and 91 combined 
Aircraft control not possible 0 0 0 26 26 
Improper or inadequate training 0 0 2  21 23 
Fatigue 0 1 (20%) 1  19  21 
Improper or inadequate 
compensation for wind conditions 
0 0 0 18  18 
Banner or glider tow flight 0 0 0 18 18 
Lost and/or disoriented 0 0 0 18 18 
WX, wind shear 0 0 0 15 15 
Light (dusk or dawn) 0 0 0 13 13 
Operation with known aircraft 
deficiency 
0 0 0 12 12 
Control interference 1 (25%) 0  11 12 
Passenger interference 0 0 1 10  11 
FAA deficiency 1 (25%) 0 3 6 10 
Company/operator deficiency 0 0 2 7 9 
Visual/aural perception 0 0 0 8 8 
Aircraft performance capability 
exceeded 
0 0 0 8 8 
Pitot blockage 0 0 0 6 6 
Improper or inadequate air traffic 
control service 0 0 0 6  6 
WX information inaccurate or 
unavailable 0 0 0 5 5 
Manufacturing deficiency 1 (25%) 0 1 3 5 
Inadequate crew coordination 1 (25%) 1 (20%) 0 2  4 
Wake turbulence 0 0 1  3 4 
Climb not possible 0 0 0 3 3 
Improper alignment 0 0 0 2  2 
Improper climb 0 0 0 2  2 
Improper descent 0 0 0 1  1 
Light (flat) 0 1 (20%) 0 0 1 
Light (Sun glare) 0 0 0 1  1 
 
TABLE 22.—FREQUENCY OF ALL CAUSES/FACTORS/FINDINGS OF LOSS OF CONTROL (LOC) ACCIDENTS ON 
APPROACH/LANDING FOLLOWING CONTROL UPSET BY OPERATION CATEGORY 
Causes/factors/findings 
Operation 
Part 121 Scheduled 
Part 135 
Nonscheduled 
Part 135  
Part 91 Part 121, 135, 
and 91 combined 
All accidents 4  8  60  1395  1467 
Inadvertent stall/spin/mush 1 (25.0%) 5 (62.5%) 30 (50.0%) 716 (51.3%) 752 (51%) 
Inadequate airspeed 0 4 (50.0%) 23 (38%) 604 (43%) 631 (43%) 
Weather (WX), winds 0 0 9 (15%) 373 (27%) 382 (26%) 
Aircraft control not maintained 0 0 12 (20%) 363 (26%) 375 (26%) 
Inadequate experience 0 1  5  174  180 
Improper or inadequate compensation for 
wind conditions 
0 0 3  174  177 
Improper planning/decision 3 (75%) 4 (50%) 14 (23%) 128  149 
Improper use of controls 1 (25%) 1  4  137 143 
WX, obscuration 0 2 (25%) 15 (25%) 106 123 
Procedures/directives not followed 1 (25%) 2 (25%) 7  96  106 
Light (night) 0 1  7  86  94 
Abort delayed or not performed 0 1  4  89  94 
Abrupt, evasive, or improperly executed 
maneuver 
0 0 2  85  87 
Spatial disorientation 0 0 2 68  70 
WX, icing 1 (25%) 3 (38%) 15 (25%) 45  64 
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Table 22.—Concluded. 
Causes/factors/findings 
Operation 
Part 121 Scheduled 
Part 135 
Nonscheduled 
Part 135  
Part 91 Part 121, 135, 
and 91 combined 
Improper or inadequate supervision by 
certified flight instructor or pilot not flying 
0 0 0 68  68 
Improper or inadequate remedial action 1 (25%) 0 5  56 62 
Incapacitation or impairment 0 0 1  61 62 
Inadequate preflight 1 (25%) 0 2  57  60 
Improper alignment 0 0 1  52  53 
Flight into adverse weather 0 1  9  42  52 
Inadequate weather evaluation 1 (25%) 0 4  47 52 
WX, turbulence 0 0 4  44  48 
WX, snow or rain 0 0 6  34 40 
Improper or inadequate aircraft handling 2 (50%) 1  1  35  39 
Diverted attention 0 0 1  33  34 
Improper altitude 0 0 2  32  34 
High-density altitude 0 0 1  32  33 
WX, wind shear 1 (25%) 0 5  30  36 
Wake turbulence 0 0 1  27  28 
Visual flight rules into instrument 
meteorological conditions 
0 0 1  23  24 
Improper glidepath 0 0 1  21 22 
Complacency or overconfidence 0 0 0 20  20 
Wrong or unsuitable runway 0 0 0 18  18 
Improper climb 0 0 1  16  17 
Aircraft control not possible 0 0 3  16  19 
WX, thunderstorm or microburst 1 (25%) 1  4  13  19 
Incorrect weight/balance   2  15  17 
Company/operator deficiency 2 (50%) 3 (38%) 8  4  17 
Operation with known aircraft deficiency   1  15  16 
Improper or inadequate training 1 (25%) 2 (25%) 2  11  16 
Improper or inadequate air traffic control 
service 
1 (25%) 1   12  15 
Lost or disoriented 0 0 0 14  14 
No causes/factors/findings 0 0 1  11  12 
FAA deficiency 2 (50%) 2 (25%) 0 7  11 
Poor judgment 1 (25%) 0 2 7  10 
Control interference 0 0 0 10  10 
Anxiety/depression/panic/pressure 0 0 0 9  9 
Fatigue 1 (25%) 0 2  5  8 
Aircraft performance capability exceeded 0 0 1  7  8 
Improper descent 0 0 0 6  6 
Lack of certification or qualification 0 0 0 5  5 
Banner tow flight 0 0 0 5  5 
Visual impairment (not physical) 0 0 0 5  5 
Manufacturing deficiency 2 (50%) 0 0 2  4 
Climb not possible 0 0 0 4  4 
Passenger interference 0 0 0 4  4 
Light (dusk or dawn) 0 0 1 3  4 
Weather information inaccurate or 
unavailable 
0 0 0 3  3 
Light (Sun glare) 0 0 0 3  3 
Visual/aural perception 0 0 0 3  3 
Pitot blockage 0 0 0 2  2 
Improper or inadequate communication 
with air traffic control 
0 0 1  1  2 
Cargo shifted 0 0 1  0 1 
WX, high temperatures 0 0 0 1  1 
Light (flat) 0 0 0 1  1 
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Table 23 provides all of the recorded causes, factors and findings for all control upset accidents by 
operation category, while Table 24 provides only the primary causes for all the control upset accidents by 
operation category. 
 
TABLE 23.—FREQUENCY OF ALL CAUSES/FACTORS/FINDINGS OF ALL LOSS OF CONTROL (LOC) 
ACCIDENTS FOLLOWING CONTROL UPSET BY OPERATION CATEGORY 
Causes/factors/findings 
Operation 
Part 121 Scheduled 
Part 135 
Nonscheduled 
Part 135 
Part 91 Part 121, 135, 
and 91 
combined 
All accidents 13 27 159 4287 4486 
Inadvertent stall/spin/mush 5 (38%) 12 (44%) 55 (35%) 2082 (49%) 2154 (48%) 
Inadequate airspeed 3 (23%) 9 (33%) 51 (32%) 1603 (37%) 1666 (37%) 
Aircraft control not maintained 1 4 36 1143 (27%) 1184 (26%) 
Weather (WX), winds 0 1 31 819 851 
Abrupt, evasive, or improperly executed 
maneuver 0 0 12 582 595 
WX, obscuration 0 1 13 433 477 
Spatial disorientation 0 1 7 395 403 
Improper planning/decision 3 (23%) 6 27 354 390 
Inadequate preflight 3 (23%) 3 20 341 367 
Light (night) 0 2 21 336 359 
Improper or inadequate compensation for 
wind conditions 0 1 11 324 336 
Improper use of controls 5 (38%) 3 7 312 327 
Incapacitation or impairment 0 1 6 277 284 
Visual flight rules into instrument 
meteorological conditions 0 1 4 277 282 
Flight into adverse weather 0 1 14 245 260 
Inadequate weather evaluation 1 0 15 224 240 
Procedures/directives not followed 3 4 13 208 228 
WX, icing 5 7 30 166 208 
WX, snow or rain 1 4 14 184 203 
Incorrect weight/balance 1 3 11 176 191 
WX, turbulence 0 1 7 179 187 
Abort delayed or not performed 0 2 6 158 166 
Improper or inadequate remedial action 2 0 7 157 166 
High-density altitude 0 0 3 243 246 
Improper (premature) liftoff 0 1 0 158 159 
Improper or inadequate supervision by 
certified flight instructor or pilot not flying 0 0 0 146 146 
Complacency, overconfidence, or 
ostentatious display 1 0 0 142 143 
Diverted attention 0 1 4 114 119 
WX, thunderstorm or microburst 1 2 9 107 119 
Improper climb 0 1 3 106 110 
Improper or inadequate aircraft handling 2 1 2 93 98 
Wrong or unsuitable runway 0 0 4 92 96 
Improper altitude 0 1 3 84 88 
No causes, factors, or findings 0 1 8 71 80 
Improper alignment 0 0 2 73 75 
WX, wind shear 1 0 5 68 74 
Aircraft control not possible 1 2 3 62 68 
Anxiety/depression/panic/pressure 0 1 3 59 63 
Aircraft performance capability exceeded 0 0 2 55 57 
Lack of certification or qualification 0 0 0 54 54 
Improper or inadequate training 2 2 5 45 53 
Inadequate ice/frost removal 2 6 9 36 53 
Poor judgment 1 0 2 46 49 
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TABLE 23.—Concluded. 
Causes or factors or findings 
Operation 
Part 121 Scheduled 
Part 135 
Nonscheduled 
Part 135 
Part 91 Part 121, 135, 
and 91 
combined 
Operation with known aircraft deficiency 0 0 1 46 47 
Company/operator deficiency 5 (38%) 6 17 17 45 
Wake turbulence 0 1 2 36 39 
Fatigue 1 1 3 34 39 
Climb not possible 0 0 4 34 38 
FAA deficiency 7 (54%) 4 4 20 35 
Improper aircraft handling 0 0 0 35 35 
Banner or glider tow flight 0 0 0 33 33 
Control interference 1 0 0 31 32 
Lost or disoriented 0 0 0 32 32 
Runway condition 0 2 3 26 31 
Checklist not followed 0 0 1 28 29 
Manufacturing deficiency 4 (31%) 1 7 13 25 
Improper or inadequate air traffic control 
service 1 1 0 21 23 
Improper glidepath 0 0 1 21 22 
Passenger interference 0 0 1 21 22 
Light (dusk or dawn) 0 0 1 21 22 
All available runway not used 0 0 0 15 15 
Visual/aural perception 0 0 0 13 13 
Pitot blockage 0 0 0 8 8 
WX information inaccurate or unavailable 0 0 0 8 8 
Cargo shifted 0 0 3 5 8 
Improper descent 0 0 0 7 7 
Light (Sun glare) 0 0 0 6 6 
Gust lock not removed 0 0 0 5 5 
Inadequate crew coordination 2 1 0 2 5 
Visual impairment (not physical) 0 0 0 5 5 
WX, high temperatures 0 0 0 5 5 
Improper or inadequate communication with 
air traffic control 0 0 1 3 4 
Light (flat) 0 1 1 1 3 
 
TABLE 24.—FREQUENCY OF PRIMARY CAUSES FOR ALL LOSS OF CONTROL (LOC) 
ACCIDENTS BY OPERATION CATEGORY 
Primary cause of LOC 
Operation  
Part 121 Scheduled 
Part 135  
Nonscheduled 
Part 135  
Part 91 Part 121, 135, and 
91 combined 
Total primary causes 26 (100%) 32 (100%) 198 (100%) 4961 (100%) 5217 (100%) 
Inadequate airspeed and/or stall 1  8 (25%) 51 (26%) 1971 (40%) 2031 (39%) 
Weather (WX), adverse winds 0 1  21  500  522 
Aircraft control not possible 9 (35%) 2 17  358  386 
Visual flight rules into instrument 
meteorological conditions 
0 0 2  260  262 
Aircraft control not maintained 0 0 8  215 223 
Spatial disorientation 1  2  7  211  221 
Unknown 0 1 12  118  134 
WX, icing 3  3 16  105  127 
Improper use of controls 0 1 4  117  123 
Pilot incapacitation 0 0 0 108  108 
Improper/premature liftoff 0 1  0 105  106 
WX, obscuration 0 0 6 83  89 
Low-altitude maneuvering 0 0 3  83  86 
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TABLE 24.—Concluded. 
Primary cause of LOC 
Operation 
Part 121 Scheduled 
Part 135  
Nonscheduled 
Part 135  
Part 91 Part 121, 135, and 
91 combined 
Pilot impairment 1 0 2 83  86 
Incorrect weight/balance 1 0 11 73  85 
WX, thunderstorm 0 2 6 76  84 
Procedural or decision error 1 3 0 80  84 
Inadequate preflight 1 1 2  64  68 
WX, wind shear 1  0 4  58  63 
Inadequate ice/frost removal 2  6 13  33  54 
Lack of experience 0 0 0 49  49 
Diverted attention 0 0 2  45  47 
Wake turbulence 0 1 2  37 40 
WX, turbulence 0 0 2  31 33 
Aircraft performance capability 
exceeded 
0 0 0 31 31 
Incorrect or unsuitable runway 0 0 4  18 22 
Passenger interference 0 0 1  20 21 
Control interference 1 0 1  17 19 
Improper handling 0 0 0 9 9 
All available runway not used 0 0 0 3  3 
WX, blizzard 0 0 1  0 1 
 
Overall, the most common cause/factor/finding of all upset-related accidents was inadvertent 
stall/spin/mush.  
Because of a combination of the small number of control upset accidents in Part 121 and the large 
number of causal factors implicated in each of these accidents, it is difficult to determine a few “most 
likely” causes in Part 121. However, accidents in Part 121 operations are more likely than those in other 
flight categories to have some blame placed on improper use of controls, icing, company/operator 
deficiency, manufacturing defects, and FAA deficiencies. In the NTSB accident data, “improper use of 
controls” involves a pilot error with the use of controls and not a failure of the control system. Examples 
are incorrect trim or flap setting for a flight attitude, or not using anti-ice/de-ice equipment, or not 
lowering landing gear. 
In Scheduled Part 135 accidents, the most likely cause, factor, or finding during takeoff was 
inadequate ice/frost removal. During the en-route phase of flight, the most likely causes of control upset 
were stall/spin/mush, inadequate airspeed, icing, and improper use of controls. During the 
approach/landing phases of flight, the most likely causes of control upset were stall/spin/mush. 
In Nonscheduled Part 135 accidents, the most likely cause, factor, or finding during takeoff was 
winds. During the en-route and approach/landing phases of flight, the most likely cause, factor, or finding 
of control upset was inadequate airspeed.  
In Part 91 accidents, the most likely cause, factor, or finding during takeoff was inadequate ice/frost 
removal. During the en-route phase of flight, the most likely causes of control upset were stall/spin/mush, 
inadequate airspeed, icing, and improper use of controls. During the approach/landing phases of flight, the 
most likely cause, factor, or finding of control upset was stall/spin/mush. 
In Part 91 accidents, the most likely cause, factor, or finding during all phases of flight was 
inadvertent stall/spin/mush. 
In looking at only the primary cause of the control upset accidents, in Part 121, aircraft control was 
not possible in more than one-third of all LOC accidents. In the other three flight categories combined, 
more than 39 percent of the LOC was primarily caused by inadequate airspeed and/or stall. 
2.5 Accident and Incident Data Analyses Conclusions 
In-flight LOC is a serious aviation problem. Well over half of the LOC accidents included at least one 
fatality (80 percent in Part 121), and roughly half of all aviation fatalities in the studied time period 
NASA/TM—2010-216261 24 
occurred in conjunction with LOC. Due to the level of aircraft damage and injury that is likely to occur, 
LOC events are rarely considered incidents 
In Part 121, LOC was somewhat more likely to occur during approach and landing (as opposed to 
takeoff or en route), but during takeoff, a LOC was most likely to result in a fatality. In Part 135 flights, 
LOC was most likely to occur during takeoff, although when control was lost during approach/landing 
80 percent of the accidents resulted in fatalities. En-route LOC was both the most frequent and the most 
often fatal of the three phases in Part 91 flights. 
In 31 percent of Part 121 LOC accidents, the LOC was secondary to an SCFM, compared with 8 to 
12 percent of the accidents in other flight operation categories. Twenty-three percent of the Part 121 LOC 
accidents were secondary to aircraft damage (most often due to fire), compared with 3 to 8 percent of the 
accidents in other flight operation categories. As a result, for roughly 35 percent of the LOC accidents in 
Part 121, aircraft control was not possible, compared with 6 to 9 percent of the accidents in other flight 
operation categories. In flights other than Part 121, 25 to 40 percent of the LOC was caused by inadequate 
airspeed leading to an inadvertent stall. Icing (both preflight and in-flight) and adverse winds were the 
primary cause of a large number of accidents. Other frequently cited causes for LOC are inadequate 
preflight, improper planning or decisions, and flying in obscuration or at night. 
3.0 NASA Analyses of Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) Incident 
Data 
3.1 Introduction 
This section examines the composition of LOC incidents as reported in the ASRS. ASRS is a 
voluntary, nonpunitive, self-reporting system administered by NASA Ames Research Center that includes 
incident reports submitted by members of the flight crew and other persons working in the aviation 
industry. The ASRS reports do not represent an unbiased sample of aviation incidents, and the results 
presented here should not be considered statistically representative, but rather informational in nature. 
The Integrated Resilient Aircraft Control (IRAC) Project is focused on technologies that allow aircraft to 
operate in adverse conditions including loss of aircraft control and weather-related events. A previous 
IRAC report dealt with the topic of aircraft icing (Ref. 6), while this report will focus on LOC. 
Data used in this analysis are from the years January 1993 to March 2008. While the ASRS online 
database includes incidents starting in 1988, information on the Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) part 
is available only beginning in 1993. Since other flight operations, such as Part 91 (general aviation), may 
have substantially different data compared with Parts 121 and 135, it was decided to use only those years 
for which FAR part was known. During this time period, there were 61,479 incident reports for 
Part 121 operations, 6208 incident reports for Part 135 operations, and 27,977 incident reports for Part 91 
operations. Each ASRS incident report lists the primary problem (or cause), an  if applicable, the 
component involved. While this categorization is performed by the experts at ASRS, the IRAC systems 
analysis team further categorized those components into groups based on aircraft subsystems.  
To obtain statistical information, the ASRS Web tool was used to query the database. Our initial 
selection criterion was incidents in which the “anomaly” was “loss of control.” The Web tool allows the 
user to export the results to a Microsoft Excel (Microsoft Corporation) file, and relevant information such as 
“FAR part” and “Primary Problem” were kept. Since the Web tool’s data export function only includes 
those fields that can be queried using the tool, component information was later obtained through 
permission of the ASRS team at NASA Ames Research Center. These data were provided in a Microsoft 
Excel file with only the component and ASRS Incident Report Number (ACN), and were matched to the 
exported data using the ACN. After combining the data in one file, the aircraft system categorization was 
added. Statistical analysis system (SAS) software was then used to perform the statistical analysis. 
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3.2 Primary Problems in Loss of Control Incidents 
For the years January 1993 to March 2008, there were 1285 LOC incidents in the ASRS database for 
Part 121, 282 LOC incidents for Part 135, and 2075 LOC incidents for Part 91. Three primary problems 
(causes) account for 972 (76 percent) of the Part 121 incidents, 244 (87 percent) of the Part 135 incidents 
and 1900 (92 percent) of the Part 91 incidents: flight crew human performance, aircraft, and weather. 
These areas will be the focus in this report. The total primary problem breakdown can be seen in 
Table 25. 
Because the IRAC Project is looking for technologies that can be incorporated in an aircraft, the 
specific areas of the aircraft that have been causing the most problems were more closely examined. 
Table 26 provides those LOC incidents that involved a component or system. For Part 121 incidents, an 
issue with air flight control was the most frequently cited (22 percent). Landing gear was cited most 
frequently in Part 135 operations (36 percent) and in Part 91 operations (24 percent.) 
A closer look is provided at those components and systems that were involved in the three most 
frequent primary problems: human performance, aircraft, and weather. 
The human performance category includes the flight crew, air traffic control, cabin crew, and/or 
passengers. Looking at Table 27, the largest causes of human performance incidents are related to the 
human’s interaction with the landing gear, brakes, air flight control, and propulsion systems. These four 
systems account for over 68 percent of all LOC incidents related to human interaction with these systems. 
Later in the analysis, the top contributors to LOC incidents will be examined in more detail. 
 
TABLE 25.—FREQUENCY OF PRIMARY PROBLEMS IN LOSS OF CONTROL 
INCIDENTS BY OPERATION CATEGORY 
Primary problem 
Operation category 
Part 121 Part 135 Part 91 Part 91, 121, and 
135 combined 
Flight crew human 
performance 
338 (26%) 106 (38%) 1217 (59%) 1661 (46%) 
Aircraft 335 (26%) 96 (34%) 448 (22%) 879 (24%) 
Weather 299 (23%) 42 (15%) 235 (11%) 576 (16%) 
Airport 63 16 41 120 
Environmental factor 71 8 33 112 
Ambiguous 43 4 55 102 
Air traffic control human 
performance 
33 6 13 52 
Maintenance human 
performance 
27 3 17 47 
Company 40 1 4 45 
Other 18 0 6 24 
Airspace structure 6 0 3 9 
Federal Aviation 
Administration 
7 0 0 7 
Passenger human 
performance 
1 0 3 4 
Navigational facility 2 0 0 2 
Cabin crew human 
performance 
1 0 0 1 
Chart or publication 1 0 0 1 
Total 1285 (100%) 282 (100%) 2075 3642 (100%) 
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TABLE 26.—FREQUENCY OF COMPONENTS OR SYSTEMS INVOLVED IN LOSS OF CONTROL (LOC) 
INCIDENTS BY OPERATION CATEGORY 
Component or system 
Operation category 
Part 121 Part 135 Part 91 Part 91, 121, and 
135 combined 
Landing gear 102 (19%) 47 (36%) 208 (26%) 357 (24%) 
Brakes 56 18 166 (21%) 240 (16%) 
Air flight control 117 (22%) 5 85 207 
Propulsion system 61 17 104 (13%) 182 
Control surfaces 73 15 56 144 
Monitoring 33 4 33 70 
Structures 6 5 14 41 
Electrical 9 2 14 25 
Miscellaneous 16 2 7 25 
Hydraulics 18 1 5 24 
Anti-icing 7 3 13 23 
Communications 3 2 14 19 
Navigation 8 0 10 18 
Fuel system 0 0 17 17 
Aircraft management 6 3 6 15 
Furnishings and equipment 7 3 5 15 
Weather systems 11 1 2 14 
Helicopter 4 1 8 13 
Environmental control 5 0 4 9 
Collision avoidance systems 2 0 0 2 
Navigation system 0 0 2 2 
Oil systems 0 0 1 1 
Total 544 (100%) 129 (100%) 790 (100%) 1463 (100%) 
 
 
 
TABLE 27.—FREQUENCY OF COMPONENTS OR SYSTEMS INVOLVED IN LOSS OF CONTROL 
INCIDENTS WITH PRIMARY PROBLEM: HUMAN PERFORMANCE BY OPERATION CATEGORY 
Component or system 
Operation category 
Part 121 Part 135 Part 91 Part 91, 121, and 
135 combined 
Landing gear 32 (19%) 10 (36%) 78 (26%) 120 (24%) 
Brakes 28 6 58 92 
Air flight control 39 2 47 88 
Propulsion system 20 5 57 82 
Control surfaces 12 5 32 49 
Monitoring 14 2 9 25 
Miscellaneous 9 0 6 15 
Structures 0 1 12 13 
Electrical 5 1 6 12 
Fuel system 0 0 12 12 
Navigation 5 0 6 11 
Anti-icing 2 1 6 9 
Communications 0 1 7 8 
Helicopter 1 1 5 7 
Furnishings and equipment 1 2 2 5 
Hydraulics 3 0 2 5 
Aircraft management 3 1 0 4 
Weather systems 8 1 0 9 
Environmental control 2 0 2 4 
Navigation system 0 0 1 1 
Total 178 (100%) 38 (100%) 349 (100%) 565 (100%) 
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For aircraft-related LOC incidents seen in Table 28, the landing gear problems are the largest source 
of incidents. Incidents related to brakes, air flight control, control surfaces, and propulsion systems 
follow. The important thing to note about this list is that these incidents are caused primarily by aircraft 
problems, not human-related factors. So while we could dismiss the fact that landing gear was near the 
top of the list for incidents attributed to human performance errors, the fact that it is on top of this list is 
notable. 
 
TABLE 28.—FREQUENCY OF COMPONENTS OR SYSTEMS INVOLVED IN LOSS OF CONTROL 
INCIDENTS WITH PRIMARY PROBLEM: AIRCRAFT BY OPERATION CATEGORY 
Component or system 
Operation Category 
Part 121 Part 135 Part 91 Part 91, 121, and 
135 combined 
Landing gear 52 (21%) 36 (50%) 107 (30%) 195 (29%) 
Brakes 21 10 95 (27%) 126 (19%) 
Air flight control 56 3 29 88  
Control surfaces 50 8 17 75 
Propulsion system 20 9 41 70 
Monitoring 11 0 14 25 
Structures 3 2 12 17 
Hydraulics 12 1 3 16 
Aircraft management 3 2 5 10 
Electrical 3 1 6 10 
Furnishings and equipment 3 1 3 7 
Anti-icing 3 0 2 5 
Communications 1 1 3 5 
Helicopter 2 0 3 5 
Miscellaneous 3 1 1 5 
Environmental control 2 0 2 4 
Fuel system 0 0 4 4 
Navigation 2 0 2 4 
Navigation system 0 0 1 1 
Oil system 0 0 1 1 
Weather systems 1 0 0 1 
Total 248 (100%) 75 (100%) 351 (100%) 674 (100%) 
 
In LOC accidents with the primary problem of weather, the components or systems that were 
involved were much more varied than in the previous primary problem categories of human performance 
and aircraft (Table 29). In Part 121, the most frequent components or systems found to contribute to LOC 
incidents were air flight control and propulsion systems. Overall, the top four systems (air flight control, 
propulsion systems, monitoring, and control surfaces) account for 52 percent of all the primary problem 
LOC incidents in the weather category. 
After looking into the top three primary problems more in depth, the top five aircraft systems in terms 
of incidents caused have been looked at more closely. Landing gear, brakes, air flight control, propulsion 
system, and control surfaces together accounted for over 77 percent of the incidents that had components 
reported. In the following sections, we will highlight the individual components in each of these systems 
that account for the majority of LOC incidents caused. 
3.3 Most Frequently Cited Aircraft Systems in Loss of Control Incidents 
3.3.1 Landing Gear 
Landing gear was the most frequently cited system in LOC incidents. A breakdown of incident 
frequencies for all landing gear components can be seen in Table 30. Nose-wheel steering accounted for 
21 percent of these incidents. The top five most frequently cited landing gear components (nose-wheel 
steering, nose gear, main gear, antiskid system, gear extend/retract mechanism, and landing gear) account 
for over 75 percent of the landing gear incidents. (These five components are shaded in Table 30.) 
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TABLE 29.—FREQUENCY OF COMPONENTS OR SYSTEMS INVOLVED IN LOSS OF CONTROL 
INCIDENTS WITH PRIMARY PROBLEM: WEATHER BY OPERATION CATEGORY 
Component or system 
Operation Category 
Part 121 Part 135 Part 91 Part 91, 121, and 
135 combined 
Air flight control 11 (20%) 0 6 17 (16%) 
Propulsion system 10 (19%) 2 (22%) 2 14 
Monitoring 4 1 8 13 
Control surfaces 5 22 (22%) 4 11 
Weather systems 8 1 0 9 
Anti-icing 1 22 (22%) 5 8 
Landing gear 5 0 3 8 
Brakes 2 0 5 7 
Structures 1 1 3 5 
Communications 1 0 2 3 
Environmental control 1 0 1 2 
Miscellaneous 2 0 0 2 
Navigation systems 0 0 2 2 
Aircraft management 0 0 1 1 
Collision avoidance system 1 0 0 1 
Electrical 1 0 0 1 
Furnishings and equipment 1 0 0 1 
Fuel system 0 0 1 1 
Total 54 (100%) 9 (100%) 43 (100%) 106 (100%) 
 
 
 
TABLE 30.—FREQUENCY OF LOC INCIDENTS RELATED 
TO LANDING GEAR COMPONENTS 
Landing gear component Frequency 
Nose-wheel steering 76 (21%) 
Nose gear 48 
Main gear 42 
Antiskid system 36 
Gear extend/retract mechanism 33 
Landing gear 33 
Main gear tire 20 
Wheels/tires/brakes 14 
Tail wheel 9 
Gear lever/selector 8 
Gear down lock 8 
Nose gear tire 6 
Nose gear wheel 4 
Tires 4 
Main gear wheel 3 
Wheel assemblies 3 
Nose gear door 2 
Gear float 2 
Gear ski 2 
Gear up lock 1 
Landing gear indicating system 1 
Main gear door 1 
Total 357 
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3.3.2 Brakes 
Only three components were specified in brake-related incidents. The normal brake system accounted 
for just under half of these incidents, with brake system and parking brake accounting for the rest. (See 
Table 31 for actual percentages.) Since adaptive control technology is not likely to address these issues, 
the brake system might not be a focus of the IRAC project, but might be treated in a similar manner to 
landing gear. 
 
TABLE 31.—FREQUENCY OF LOSS OF CONTROL 
INCIDENTS RELATED TO BRAKE COMPONENTS 
Brake component Frequency 
Normal brake system 132 (55%) 
Brake system 64 (27%) 
Parking brake 44 (18%) 
Total 240 (100%) 
3.3.3 Air Flight Control 
Looking into the air flight control system more in depth, the autopilot is the cause of over half of the 
LOC incidents (Table 32). Following this are the aeroplane flight control, autoflight system, and the flight 
management system/flight management computer.  
 
TABLE 32.—FREQUENCY OF LOSS OF CONTROL (LOC) INCIDENTS 
RELATED TO AIR FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM COMPONENTS 
Flight control system component Frequency 
Autopilot 104 
Aeroplane flight control 35 
Autoflight system 27 
Flight management system/flight management computer (FMS/FMC) 20 
Flight control computer (FCC) 5 
Mode control panel (MCP) 4 
Autoland 3 
Inertial navigation system (INS) inertial reference system (IRS)/inertial 
reference unit (IRU) 
2 
Flight augmentation computer (FAC) 2 
Full authority digital engine control (FADEC)/thrust control computer (TCC)  2 
Flight control unit (FCU) 2 
Altitude heading reference system (AHRS)/navigation display (ND) 1 
Total 207 
 
3.3.4 Propulsion Systems 
The propulsion system components that contribute to LOC incidents are much more varied than the 
other looked at in this study as shown in Table 33. The largest contributor to incidents in the propulsion 
system is the throttle/power level, with just over 15 percent of propulsion-related incidents. The next 
largest contributors were the engine, turbine engine, reciprocating engine assembly and the speedbrake 
spoiler. These components make up over 50 percent of propulsion-related incidents. These components 
are shaded in Table 25, and a full list of components that caused incidents relating to the propulsion 
system is available as well. 
3.3.5 Control Surfaces 
The actual components listed that fall under the control surfaces aircraft system are a little less 
concentrated than the previous two systems as presented in Table 34. The rudder, aileron, and elevator 
control systems account for 44 percent of all control-surface-related LOC incidents. The various control 
systems may be areas of research that the IRAC project could contribute to. 
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TABLE 33.—FREQUENCY OF LOSS OF CONTROL INCIDENTS RELATED 
TO PROPULSION SYSTEM COMPONENTS 
Propulsion system component Frequency Propulsion system component Frequency 
Throttle/power level 28 (15%) Engine electric starter 1 
Engine 23 (13%) Engine starting system 1 
Turbine engine 15 Engine torque indication 1 
Reciprocating engine assembly 15 Exhaust manifold 1 
Speedbrake/spoiler 13 Inverter 1 
Turbine engine thrust reverser 11 Main rotor 1 
Propeller blade 9 Main rotor hub 1 
Rudder 9 Powerplant fuel control 1 
Engine control 7 Powerplant fuel distribution 1 
Thrust reverser control 4 Propeller assembly 1 
Carburetor 4 Propeller brake 1 
Powerplant fuel control unit 4 Propeller control 1 
Propeller pitch change mechanism 4 Propeller ice system 1 
Vacuum system 3 Propeller reversing 1 
Carburetor heat control 3 Reverse actuator 1 
Spoiler system 2 Reverser clamshell door 1 
Powerplant mounting 2 Supercharger 1 
Propeller 2 Switch 1 
Propeller synchronization 2 Vacuum pump 1 
Auxiliary engine turbine 1   
Combustor assembly 1 Total 182 
 
 
TABLE 34.—FREQUENCY OF LOSS OF CONTROL INCIDENTS 
RELATED TO CONTROL SURFACE COMPONENTS 
Control systems component Frequency 
Rudder control system 24 (17%) 
Aileron control system 20 (14%) 
Elevator control system 19 
Elevator trim system 18 
Elevator 8 
Horizontal stabilizer trim 7 
Trailing edge flap 6 
Pitot/static ice system 5 
Aileron 5 
Rudder pedal 5 
Trailing edge flap control 5 
Elevator control column 4 
Rudder trim system 4 
Flap/slat control system 3 
Horizontal stabilizer control 3 
Aileron control column 2 
Horizontal stabilizer 2 
Aileron trim system 1 
Elevator feel system 1 
Elevator tab 1 
Gust lock 1 
Total 144 
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3.4 Aviation Safety Reporting System Data Analysis Conclusions 
Of the 1463 LOC incidents for Part 91, 12, and 135 identified with a system or component problems 
in the ASRS database, over 210 systems or components are identified as contributing to the incident. The 
most frequent of these components or systems are provided in Table 35. These 24 components account 
for 63 percent of all LOC incidents attributed to component or system failures or malfunctions. 
Looking at the analysis from a slightly higher level, five aircraft systems have been identified as 
critical in regards to the frequency of incidents they represent. These systems are landing gear, brakes, air 
flight control, propulsion systems, and control surfaces.  
 
 
TABLE 35.—FREQUENCY OF THE TOP SYSTEMS OR COMPONENTS 
RELATED TO LOSS OF CONTROL INCIDENTS 
System or component Frequency 
Normal brake system 132 
Autopilot 104 
Nose-wheel steering 76 
Brake system 64 
Nose gear 48 
Parking brake 44 
Main gear 42 
Antiskid system 36 
Aeroplane flight control 35 
Gear extend/retract mechanism 33 
Landing gear 33 
Throttle/power level 28 
Autoflight system 27 
Autothrottle/speed control 26 
Rudder control system 24 
Engine 23 
Aileron control system 20 
Flight management system/flight 
management computer 
20 
Main gear tire 20 
Elevator control system 19 
Attitude indicator 18 
Elevator trim system 18 
Hydraulic main system 15 
Turbine engine 15 
Total 920 
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4.0 Adverse Conditions Table 
The purpose of the adverse conditions table found in the IRAC technical plan is to provide focus to 
the technology validation strategy. The adverse conditions are those events that lead or contribute to LOC 
incidents or accidents. These adverse condition types are categorized into three types: failure, damage, 
and upset. The failure adverse condition is defined as a system/component that does not work properly 
including degradation of performance. Damage is defined as a structure or component that is broken. 
Upset consists of pilot error and/or LOC due to occurrences that cannot be regulated via aircraft 
technology. 
The IRAC Systems Analysis Team has updated the initial adverse conditions table by collecting 
accident and incident data gleaned from findings within the ASRS, FAA, and NTSB databases. The intent 
was to call attention to damage conditions that occur frequently while providing insight on their severity 
and frequency. Primarily, the majority of the accidents were derived from the NTSB database, and the 
incidents were extracted from the ASRS database. 
Thirteen adverse conditions subtypes of significance were found. Suggested initial test conditions are 
provided in the table for each of the adverse condition subtypes. The severity and frequency of each 
subtype is provided also as a means of prioritizing the example damage conditions. Finally, applicable 
IRAC milestones are referenced. Table 36 is the updated adverse conditions table. 
 
TABLE 36.—ADVERSE TEST CONDITIONS 
Adverse 
condition 
Adverse condition 
subtype 
Severity and 
frequency 
Initial test conditions Milestone references 
Failure: System/ 
component does 
not work 
properly. 
Includes 
degradation of 
performance. 
1. Landing gear 
• Nose-wheel steering  
• Main gear and tire 
• Antiskid/braking 
system 
• Gear extend/retract 
mechanism 
Accident (1) 
 
Incident (597)  
 
• Use of a landing gear test 
facility to perform dynamometer 
testing of aircraft wheel and 
brake assemblies 
• Structural testing on strength 
and fatigue of body and wing 
landing gear (F–15)  
• Baseline F–15 
adaptive control 
assessment/validation 
• IRAC 4.1.1 
• Systems analysis/data 
mining for test 
condition refinement 
• IRAC 4.2.2 (leverages 
integrated vehicle 
health management 
(IVHM) data-mining 
expertise) 
• Requirements and test 
criteria 
• IRAC 2.5.2.2 
Simulation evaluation 
of test conditions 
• IRAC 3.1.1.1, 3.2.1.1, 
and 4.1.2.1 
• Full-scale F/A–18 
assessment/validation 
• IRAC 4.1.2.2 
2. Avionics 
• Autopilot/flight 
• Flight 
management/monitoring 
system 
• Weather radar 
Accident (1) 
 
Incident (347)  
 
Use of flight simulators to test 
numerous challenges using real 
flight data configuration, winds, 
terrain, and runway info 
3. Electrical 
• Auxiliary power unit 
• Radar 
• Actuator wire breaks 
• Wire chafing 
Accident (3) 
 
Incident (25)  
 
Physics of fault modeling at the 
component level and accelerated 
aging tests to characterize 
degradation 
4. Hydraulics Accident (0) 
 
Incident (24)  
 
Experimental testing of 
monitoring approach on a 
representative actuator subjected 
to nominal and accelerated wear 
conditions 
5. Static and dynamic 
actuator failure effects 
(single actuator and 
multiple actuator 
failures) 
Accident (n/a) 
 
Incident (n/a)  
 
• Locked stabilator (F–15) 
• Stabilator driven to local 
angle-of-attack (F/A–18) 
6. Environmental 
Control System 
• Pressurization system 
Accident (1) 
 
Incident (9)  
 
Perform pressurization 
diagnostic tests by means of 
actual or simulated flight (F–15) 
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TABLE 36.—Concluded. 
Adverse 
condition 
Adverse condition 
subtype 
Severity and 
frequency 
Initial test conditions Milestone references 
Damage: 
Structure/ 
component is 
broken.  
7. Propulsion system 
• Throttle/power level 
system 
• Engine 
   -fire 
   -engine icing 
• Fuel system  
Accident (20) 
 
Incident (182)  
 
Use of an aircraft engine test 
facility to perform testing on all 
necessary components in 
addition to thrust measurements  
• Baseline F–15 
adaptive control 
assessment/validation 
• IRAC 4.1.1  
• Systems analysis/data 
mining for test 
condition refinement 
• IRAC 4.2.2 (leverages 
IVHM data-mining 
expertise) 
• Requirements and test 
criteria 
• IRAC 2.5.2.2 
• Simulation evaluation 
of test conditions 
• IRAC 3.1.1.1, 3.2.1.1, 
and 4.1.2.1 
• Full-scale F/A–18 
assessment/validation 
• IRAC 4.1.2.2 
8. Control surfaces 
• Rudder, aileron, and 
elevator 
Accident (8) 
 
Incident (144)  
 
9. Aerodynamic and 
structural damage  
(wing and/or tail) 
Accident (1) 
 
Incident  (41)  
 
• Destabilizing angle-of-attack 
feedback to the canards, wing 
damage simulation (F–15) 
• Locked flaps (F/A–18) 
 
Upsets: 
Consists of pilot 
error and/or loss 
of control due to 
occurrences that 
cannot be 
regulated via 
aircraft 
technology. 
10. Electrical Accident (3) 
 
Incident (25)  
 
Physics of fault modeling at the 
component level and accelerated 
aging tests to characterize 
degradation 
• Systems analysis/data 
mining for test 
condition refinement 
• IRAC 4.2.2 (leverages 
IVHM data-mining 
expertise) 
• Requirements and test 
criteria 
• IRAC 2.5.1.1 
• Simulation evaluation 
of test conditions 
• IRAC 3.1.2.1 and 
3.2.2.1 
 
11. Severe weather 
• Icing 
• Winds 
• Poor evaluation of 
weather 
Accident (56) 
 
Incident (n/a)  
 
Analytical study of icing physics 
and winds; experimental testing 
of propulsion icing/winds in 
available facilities 
12. Inadequate 
attitude/airspeed, and/or 
stall/spin 
Accident (36) 
 
Incident (n/a) 
 
• Elevated angle of arrival (pre-
stall) 
• Stall 
13. Pilot 
• Improper use of 
controls  
• Inadequate 
training/experience 
 
Accident (104) 
 
Incident (n/a) 
 
• Use of Ames Research 
Center’s “Human Factors 
Research” to further investigate 
testing procedures 
5.0 Discussion and Conclusions 
In-flight loss of control (LOC) is a serious aviation problem. Well over half of the LOC accidents 
included at least one fatality (81 percent in Part 121), and roughly half of all aviation fatalities in the 
studied time period occurred in conjunction with LOC. 
In Part 121, LOC was somewhat more likely to occur during approach and landing (as opposed to 
takeoff or en route), but during takeoff a LOC was most likely to result in a fatality. In Part 135 flights, 
LOC was least likely to occur en route, although when control was lost en route in Nonscheduled Part 135 
it almost always resulted in fatalities. 
In about 31 percent of in-flight Part 121 LOC accidents, the LOC was secondary to a 
system/component failure/malfunction, compared with 8 to 12 percent of the accidents in other flight 
operation categories. Twenty-three percent of the in-flight Part 121 LOC accidents were secondary to 
aircraft damage (most often due to fire), compared with 3 to 8 percent of the accidents in other flight 
operation categories. As a result, for roughly 35 percent of the inflight LOC accidents in Part 121, aircraft 
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control was not possible, compared with 6 to 9 percent of the accidents in other flight operation 
categories. 
While the ASRS database includes over 210 components that contributed to LOC incidents in 
Parts 121, 135 and 91 flights, nearly 63 percent of all incidents were attributed to a component 
malfunction or failure related to about 24 components or systems. Five aircraft systems have been 
identified as critical in regards to the frequency of incidents they represent. These systems are landing 
gear, brakes, air flight control, propulsion systems, and control surfaces. The top five most cited systems 
or components in LOC incidents were normal brake system, autopilot, nose-wheel steering, brake system, 
and nose gear.  
The adverse conditions types were categorized as failure, damage, and upset. Thirteen separate 
adverse conditions subtypes were found. In the “failure” category, landing gear/brakes, avionics, 
electrical, and hydraulic systems account for the majority of LOC incidents. The propulsion system, 
control surfaces, and aerodynamic and structural damage account for the majority of LOC accidents and 
incidents in the “damage” category, while severe weather, inadequate attitude/airspeed, stall/spin, 
electrical, and pilot error account for the majority of “upset” LOC accidents.  
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Appendix A.—Acronyms 
ACN  ASRS Incident Report Number 
ARC  abnormal runway contact 
AHRS  altitude heading reference system 
AMAN  abrupt maneuver 
ARMD  Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate 
ASIAS  Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing 
ASRS  Aviation Safety Reporting System 
ATM  air traffic management 
AvSAFE Aviation Safety Program 
CAST/ICAO Commercial Aviation Safety Team/International Civil Aviation Organization 
CICTT  CAST/ICAO Common Taxonomy Team 
FAA  Federal Aviation Administration 
FAC  flight augmentation computer 
FADEC full authority digital engine control 
FAR  Federal Aviation Regulation 
FCC  flight control computer 
FCU  flight control unit 
F–POST fire post impact 
FMC  flight management computer 
FMS  flight management system 
ICE  icing 
Inst/Com/Nav instrumentation/communication/navigation 
IMC  instrument meteorological conditions 
INS  inertial navigation system 
IRAC  Integrated Resilient Aircraft Control 
IRS  inertial reference system 
IRU  inertial reference unit 
IVHM  integrated vehicle health management 
LOC  loss of control 
LOC–I  loss of control, in-flight 
MCP  mode control panel 
NASA  National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
ND  navigation display 
NTSB  National Transportation Safety Board 
RAMP  ground handling  
SAS  Statistical Analysis System  
SCFM  system/component failure/malfunction 
SCF–NP system/component failure/malfunction, nonpowerplant 
SCF–PP  system/component failure/malfunction, powerplant 
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TCC  thrust control computer 
UNK  unknown 
VFR  visual flight rules 
WSTRW windshear or thunderstorm 
WX  weather 
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Appendix B.—In-Flight Loss of Control Accidents in Part 121 and 
Scheduled Part 135 Flight Operations 
The tables in this appendix list the accidents in Part 121 and Scheduled Part 135 flight operations that 
were determined to include in-flight loss of control. In each table, the following information is provided: 
 
 National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) report number 
 Event date 
 Commercial Aviation Safety Team/International Civil Aviation Organization (CAST/ICAO) aviation 
occurrence categories determined for this accident 
 If the accident included a system/component failure/malfunction (SCFM) of either the powerplant 
(SCF–PP) or non-powerplant (SCF–NP), the specific system involved is listed under “System.” 
 The phase of flight for the initiating event of the accident. 
 The level of aircraft damage: destroyed, substantial, or minor. 
 The highest degree of injury associated with the accident (fatal, serious, minor, or none), and the 
number of fatalities, if any. 
 The primary cause for the loss of control. If the listed cause is “Not possible,” then the NTSB 
determined that under the circumstances (usually component failure or damage), it was not 
possible for the pilot to maintain control of the aircraft. 
 
Explanation of the CAST/ICAO aviation occurrence categories cited in the tables is provided below 
(Ref. 5). 
 
Common Taxonomy Team Aviation Occurrence Categories Definitions found in Tables 37 to 42 
 
AMAN (abrupt maneuver).—The intentional abrupt maneuvering of the aircraft by the flight crew 
ARC (abnormal runway contract).—Any landing or takeoff involving abnormal runway or landing 
surface contact 
ATM (ATM/CNS).—Occurrences involving air traffic management (ATM) or communications, 
navigation, or surveillance (CNS) service issues  
F–NI (Fire/smoke (nonimpact)) 
F–POST (Fire/smoke (post-impact)).—Fire/smoke resulting from impact 
 
ICE (icing).—Accumulation of snow, ice, freezing rain, or frost on aircraft surfaces that adversely  
affects aircraft control or performance 
LALT (low-altitude operations).—Collision or near collision with obstacles/objects/terrain while 
intentionally operating near the surface (excludes takeoff or landing phases) 
LOC–I (loss of control–in-flight).—Loss of aircraft control while or deviation from intended flight path 
in flight 
RAMP (Ground handling).—Occurrences during (or as a result of) ground handling operations 
RE (runway excursion).—A veer off or overrun off the runway surface 
SCF–NP (system/component failure/malfunction (non-powerplant)).—Failure or malfunction of an 
aircraft system or component, other than the powerplant 
SCF–PP (system/component failure/malfunction (powerplant)).—Failure or malfunction of an aircraft 
system component related to the powerplant 
TURB (turbulence encounter).—In-flight turbulence encounter 
UNK (unknown or undetermined).—Insufficient information exists to categorize the occurrence 
WSTRW (windshear or thunderstorm).—Flight into windshear or thunderstorm 
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TABLE 37.—LOSS OF CONTROL (LOC) ACCIDENTS IN PART 121 (1988 TO 2004) FOLLOWING SCFM 
NTSB report 
number 
Event 
date 
CAST/ICAO 
aviation 
occurrence 
categories 
System Phase of 
flight 
Aircraft 
damage 
Highest 
injury 
(fatalities) 
Cause of LOC 
DCA00MA026 2/16/2000 SCF–NP, LOC–I, 
F–POST 
Flight control Takeoff Destroyed Fatal 
(3) 
Not possible 
DCA03MA022 1/8/2003 SCF–NP, RAMP, 
LOC–I, 
F–POST 
Flight control Takeoff Destroyed Fatal 
(21) 
Not possible 
DCA00MA023 1/31/2000 SCF–NP, LOC–I Flight control Cruise Destroyed Fatal 
(88) 
Not possible 
DCA94MA076 9/8/1994 SCF–NP, LOC–I, 
F–POST 
Flight control Approach Destroyed Fatal 
(132) 
Not possible 
MIA96FA059 1/7/1996 SCF–NP, LOC–I Landing gear Takeoff Substantial Minor Improper 
procedure or 
decision 
DCA92MA022 2/15/1992 SCF–NP, LOC–I, 
F–POST 
Inst/Com/ 
Nav 
Missed 
Approach 
Destroyed Fatal 
(4) 
Spatial 
disorientation 
DCA91MA023 3/3/1991 SCF–NP, LOC–I, 
F–POST 
Flight control Approach Destroyed Fatal 
(25) 
Not possible 
DCA89MA063 7/19/1989 SCF–PP, LOC–I, 
F–POST 
Engine Cruise Destroyed Fatal (111) Not specified 
 
TABLE 38.—LOSS OF CONTROL (LOC) ACCIDENTS IN PART 121 (1988 TO 2004) FOLLOWING DAMAGE 
NTSB report 
number 
Event date CAST/ICAO 
accident 
categories 
System Phase of 
flight 
Aircraft 
damage 
Highest 
injury 
(fatalities) 
Cause of LOC 
MIA97RA011 10/22/1996 F–NI, 
LOC–I 
None Takeoff Destroyed Fatal (340) UNK 
DCA96MA054 5/11/1996 F–NI, 
LOC–I 
None Climb Destroyed Fatal (110) Not possible 
DCA96MA070 7/17/1996 F–NI, 
LOC–I 
None Climb Destroyed Fatal (230) Not possible 
DCA02MA001 11/12/2001 AMAN, 
SCF–NP, 
LOC–I, 
F–POST 
Flight 
control 
Takeoff Destroyed Fatal (265) Not possible 
MIA95RA162 6/27/1995 F–NI, 
LOC–I 
None Maneuver-
ing 
Destroyed Fatal (2) UNK 
ANC96FA102 7/20/1996 SCF–PP, 
F–NI, 
SCF–NP, 
LOC–I 
Engine, 
wing 
Cruise Destroyed Fatal (4) Not possible 
 
 
 
TABLE 39.—LOSS OF CONTROL (LOC) ACCIDENTS IN PART 121 (1988 TO 2004) FOLLOWING  
CONTROL UPSET 
NTSB report 
number 
Event date CAST/ICAO 
accident 
categories 
System Phase of 
flight 
Aircraft 
damage 
Fatalities Cause of 
LOC 
DCA88MA072 8/31/1988 LOC–I, 
F–POST 
None Takeoff Destroyed Fatal 
(14) 
Improper use 
of controls 
DCA91MA021 2/17/1991 ICE, 
LOC–I, 
F–POST 
None Takeoff Destroyed Fatal (2) Inadequate 
ice removal 
DCA92MA025 3/22/1992 ICE, 
LOC–I 
None Takeoff Destroyed Fatal 
(27) 
Inadequate 
ice removal 
NASA/TM—2010-216261 39 
 
 
 
TABLE 39.—Concluded. 
NTSB report 
number 
Event date CAST/ICAO 
accident 
categories 
System Phase of 
flight 
Aircraft 
damage 
Fatalities Cause of 
LOC 
DCA97MA059 8/7/1997 RAMP, 
LOC–I, 
F–POST 
None Takeoff Destroyed Fatal (5) Weight and  
balance 
MIA94FA169 6/29/1994 LOC–I None Cruise Minor Serious Control 
interference 
DCA95MA001 10/31/1994 ICE, 
LOC–I 
None Maneuvering Destroyed Fatal 
(68) 
Icing 
DCA97MA049 5/12/1997 LOC–I None Descent Minor Serious Airspeed/ 
stall 
DCA01MA031 3/19/2001 ICE, 
LOC–I 
None Cruise Substantial None Icing 
CHI89MA057 3/15/1989 ICE, 
LOC–I, 
F–POST 
None Descent Destroyed Fatal (2) Icing 
DCA89MA035 3/18/1989 RAMP, 
LOC–I, 
F–POST 
None Takeoff Destroyed Fatal (2) Inadequate 
preflight 
DCA93RA060 8/18/1993 LOC–I, 
F–POST 
None Approach Destroyed Serious Pilot 
impaired 
DCA94MA065 7/2/1994 ATM, 
WSTRW, 
LOC–I, 
F–POST 
None Missed 
approach 
Destroyed Fatal 
(37) 
Windshear 
 
 
 
TABLE 40.—LOSS OF CONTROL (LOC) ACCIDENTS IN SCHEDULED PART 135 (1988 TO 2004)  
FOLLOWING SCFM 
NTSB report 
number 
Event date CAST/ICAO 
accident 
categories 
System Phase of 
flight 
Aircraft 
damage 
Highest 
injury 
(fatalities) 
Cause of 
LOC 
DCA88MA059 5/24/1988 SCF–PP, 
LOC–I, 
F–POST 
Engine Takeoff Destroyed Serious Improper 
procedure or 
decision 
DCA91MA052 9/11/1991 SCF–NP, LOC–I, 
F–POST 
Flight 
control 
Descent Destroyed Fatal (14) Not possible 
DCA91MA033 4/5/1991 SCF–PP, LOC–I, 
F–POST 
Propeller Approach Destroyed Fatal (23) Not possible 
 
 
 
TABLE 41.—LOSS OF CONTROL (LOC) ACCIDENTS IN SCHEDULED PART 135 (1988 TO 2004)  
FOLLOWING DAMAGE 
NTSB report 
number 
Event date CAST/ICAO 
accident 
categories 
System Phase of 
flight 
Aircraft 
damage 
Highest 
injury 
(fatalities) 
Cause of 
LOC 
ANC00MA125 9/18/2000 ARC, 
SCF–NP, LOC–I, 
F–POST 
Landing 
gear 
Landing Destroyed Fatal (5) Airspeed or 
stall 
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TABLE 42.—LOSS OF CONTROL (LOC) ACCIDENTS IN SCHEDULED PART 135 (1988 TO 2004) 
FOLLOWING CONTROL UPSET 
NTSB report 
number 
Event date CAST/ICAO 
accident 
categories 
System Phase of 
flight 
Aircraft 
damage 
Fatalities Cause of LOC 
DCA88MA032 2/19/1988 LOC–I, 
F–POST 
None Takeoff Destroyed Fatal 
(12) 
Spatial 
disorientation 
ANC90LA076 5/24/1990 LOC–I None Takeoff Substantial None Adverse 
weather, winds 
ANC92LA052 3/24/1992 LOC–I None Takeoff Substantial Minor Airspeed or 
stall 
ANC92LA057 4/2/1992 ICE, RAMP, 
LOC–I 
None Takeoff Substantial None Inadequate ice 
removal 
ANC92LA140 8/22/1992 LOC–I None Takeoff Substantial None Improper 
procedure or 
decision 
LAX93LA019 10/27/1992 TURB, LOC–I None Takeoff Destroyed Fatal (3) Wake 
turbulence 
ANC93FA034 2/20/1993 ICE, LOC–I None Takeoff Destroyed None Inadequate ice 
removal 
LAX93FA287 7/12/1993 RAMP, LOC–I, 
F–POST 
None Takeoff Destroyed Fatal (3) Inadequate 
preflight 
ANC96LA012 11/3/1995 ICE, LOC–I None Takeoff Substantial None Inadequate ice 
removal 
ANC98MA008 11/8/1997 ICE, RAMP, 
LOC–I 
None Takeoff Destroyed Fatal (8) Inadequate ice 
removal 
ANC98LA056 5/21/1998 LOC–I None Takeoff Substantial None Premature 
liftoff 
NYC99FA220 9/5/1999 LOC–I None Takeoff Substantial Fatal (3) Airspeed or 
stall 
ANC00LA021 12/24/1999 ICE, LOC–I None Takeoff Substantial Minor Inadequate ice 
removal 
SEA02FA002 10/3/2001 RAMP, LOC–I None Takeoff Substantial Fatal (3) Airspeed or 
stall 
DCA02MA003 10/10/2001 ICE, LOC–I None Takeoff Destroyed Fatal 
(10) 
Inadequate ice 
removal 
ANC91LA021 1/18/1991 LALT, LOC–I None Maneuvering Substantial Serious Airspeed or stall 
ANC92FA083 12/13/1991 LOC–I, F-POST None Cruise Destroyed Fatal (1) UNK 
MIA92FA067 1/23/1992 WSTRW, LOC–I None Descent Destroyed Fatal (2) Thunderstorm 
FTW93MA143 4/29/1993 ICE, LOC–I, 
SCF–PP, RE 
Propeller Climb Substantial Minor Icing 
ANC99FA047 4/14/1999 LOC–I None Cruise Destroyed Fatal (1) Spatial 
disorientation 
DCA90MA011 12/26/1989 ICE, ATM,  
LOC–I, F–POST 
None Approach Destroyed Fatal (6) Icing 
DCA91MA042 7/10/1991 WSTRW,  
LOC–I, F–POST 
None Approach Destroyed Fatal 
(13) 
Thunderstorm 
MIA92MA131 6/7/1992 LOC–I None Approach Destroyed Fatal (5) Controls 
DCA94MA027 1/7/1994 LOC–I,  
F–POST 
None Approach Destroyed Fatal (5) Airspeed or 
stall 
ANC94LA031 2/8/1994 LOC–I None Approach Substantial None Airspeed or 
stall 
DCA95MA006 12/13/1994 LOC–I, 
 F–POST 
None Approach Destroyed Fatal 
(15) 
Improper 
procedure or 
decision 
DCA97MA017 1/9/1997 ICE, LOC–I, 
F–POST 
None Approach Destroyed Fatal 
(29) 
Airspeed or 
stall 
ANC00LA009 10/28/1999 ICE, LOC–I None Cruise Substantial None Icing 
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